Skip to navigation – Site map
Articles

South Korea’s Transition from Recipient to DAC Donor: Assessing Korea’s Development Cooperation Policy

Axel Marx and Jadir Soares
p. 107-142

Abstracts

Since the 1960s, South Korea has transformed from a recipient country of official development assistance to a significant donor. In 2010, South Korea became a Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member. This paper aims to analyse Korean development cooperation policies and place them in comparison with other donors. The analysis begins with an examination of the wider context of evolving development cooperation that frames the Korean policies. In the second section, the paper analyses Korean development cooperation and its primary objectives. This is followed by a discussion of various different approaches toward development cooperation, specifically focussing on aid conditionality (or lack thereof), the use of grants versus loans and the use of multilateral channels in comparison with bilateral channels. The paper goes on to highlight the destinations of Korean aid in terms of both geography and economic sectors. The last section reflects on the paper’s overall findings, with specific reference to the place of Korea in the wider donor landscape, arguing that Korea constitutes a traditional DAC donor.

De bénéficiaire à donateur : évolution de la politique de coopération au développement de la Corée du Sud

Depuis les années 1960, la Corée du Sud est passée du statut de pays bénéficiaire de l'aide publique au développement à celui de donateur important. En 2010, la Corée du Sud est devenue membre du Comité d'Aide au Développement (CAD). Cet article vise à analyser les politiques coréennes de coopération au développement, pour les comparer ensuite avec celles d'autres donateurs. L'analyse commence par l’examen du contexte plus large de l’évolution de la coopération au développement encadrant les politiques coréennes. La deuxième partie de l’article analyse la coopération coréenne au développement et ses principaux objectifs. S’ouvre ensuite une discussion sur les différentes approches de la coopération au développement, qui se concentre spécifiquement sur la conditionnalité de l'aide (ou son absence), l'utilisation de dons plutôt que de prêts et le recours aux canaux multilatéraux par rapport aux canaux  bilatéraux. L’article met ensuite en évidence les diverses destinations de l'aide coréenne en termes géographiques et de secteurs économiques. La dernière partie se penche sur les résultats globaux de cette étude, en décrivant précisément quelle place occupe la Corée dans le paysage plus large des donateurs, en faisant valoir que la Corée fait partie des donateurs traditionnels du CAD.

La transición de Corea del Sur de receptor a donante del CAD: Evaluando la Política coreana de cooperación para el desarrollo

Desde los años 1960s, Corea del Sur se ha transformado de un país receptor de asistencia oficial para el desarrollo a un donante significativo. En el año 2010, Corea del Sur se convirtió en un miembro del Comité de Asistencia para el Desarrollo(CAD). Este artículo se propone analizar las políticas coreanas de cooperación para el desarrollo para compararlas con las de otros donantes. El análisis comienza con una evaluación del contexto más amplio de la evolución de cooperación para el desarrollo que enmarca las políticas coreanas. En la segunda sección, el documento analiza la cooperación coreana para el desarrollo y sus principales objetivos. Posteriormente, se discuten diferentes enfoques respecto a la cooperación para el desarrollo, enfocándose específicamente en la ayuda condicionada (o en la ausencia de la misma), el uso de subvenciones en comparación con préstamos, y en el uso de canales multilaterales en comparación con canales bilaterales. El artículo procede a resaltar el destino de la ayuda de Corea en términos geográficos y sectoriales. La última sección reflexiona respecto a los principales hallazgos del documento, con una referencia específica al papel de Corea del Sur en el campo de los donantes internacionales, argumentando que Corea constituye un donante tradicional del CAD.

Top of page

Full text

The authors would like to thank David D’Hollander, the participants of the EU-Korea workshop (Seoul, 25 September 2012), Gilles Carbonnier and the two anonymous reviewers of the International Development Policy journal for their valuable comments on a previous draft of this paper.

1. Introduction

1The world of development cooperation is changing significantly as new players (donor countries) manifest themselves on the global scene. This results not only in an increase in overall actors, but also in a diversification of models, each with its own objectives, for development cooperation (Walz and Ramachandran, 2010). At the same time, an increasing interest in building partnerships, with a specific focus on trilateral cooperation, has emerged (Busan Declaration, 2011). In light of these changes, this paper aims to analyse the role of the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) in this new development context through an examination of its strategies and performance.

  • 1  Art. 208(1) TFEU states: ‘Union policy in the field of development cooperation shall be conducted (...)
  • 2  European Commission, Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, The European Economic (...)
  • 3  Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States mee (...)
  • 4  Council Of the European Union, Council Conclusions ‘EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Huma (...)
  • 5  Council Of the European Union, Council conclusions ‘The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Th (...)

2Although the paper primarily focuses on Korean development cooperation policy, it frames this analysis within a broader exploration of the European Union (EU)’s efforts to further its development cooperation policy in partnership with new and emerging partners. From this perspective, the paper will assess the potential prospects of collaboration between the EU and Korea. The EU’s desire to ‘improve the tools of global governance’ (European Commission, 2003) has led it to take an active interest in becoming a leading actor in global economic development. The EU has had a role in development and development cooperation since the beginning of the European project. Over the years, its role in development cooperation has steadily grown and its strategies have changed. Following the 2005 European Consensus on Development, EU development policy has aimed to improve the effectiveness of global development assistance, progressing towards the achievement of the ­­­Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Paris and Accra Action Agenda targets. Article 21 (2)(d) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) lists ‘foster[ing] the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty’ as one of the EU’s primary external action objectives. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) stipulates that development cooperation is to be conducted under the auspices of the EU’s principles and objectives for external action, which include the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.1 In the last decade, human rights have gained greater prominence in the external action of the European Commission/EU (European Commission, Directorate–General Development and Cooperation, 2011b: 69) and, in recent years, the EU has made efforts to explicitly link development and human rights goals (Bartels, 2008:128). The EC’s Agenda for Change (2011), for instance, recognizes that ‘the objectives of development, democracy, human rights, good governance and security are intertwined,’2 while the EU acknowledges that ‘sustainable development includes good governance, human rights and political, economic, social and environmental aspects.’3 Most recently, efforts to enhance the status of human rights in the EU’s external and development policy were reaffirmed by the adoption of the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy.4 This plan calls for the application of a ‘human rights-based approach’ throughout the EU’s development policy. Similarly, the recent revision of the EU’s policy on providing budget support to third countries should also be highlighted, as the new version places greater importance on ‘good governance’ and respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law.5

3In order to achieve its development objectives in an increasingly multi-polar and polycentric world, the EU develops partnerships with a range of actors. In this context, Korea has emerged as a particularly attractive state with which to further develop partnerships for development cooperation. Korea is an exceptional example of sustained economic development (Evans, 1995; Amsden, 2002) as in a few short decades it transitioned from constituting a recipient of development cooperation to a donor. Correspondingly, Korea has taken a lead role in advancing the ‘[global] development agenda’.  At its 2010 summit in Seoul, the G-20, then led by Korea, agreed to the so-called ‘Seoul Consensus’ on development policy, intended to replace the Washington Consensus. The Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth is a set of principles and guidelines aimed at promoting economic development and the achievement of the MDGs in the less developed countries. The core principles focus, inter alia,on economic growth, global development partnerships, private sector development and participation, policy complementarity, and creating tangible outcomes to address significant development problems. In 2011, Korea hosted the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) in Busan, which resulted in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation.

4In the context of development cooperation, the ambitions of the EU and Korea appear to align. At the sixth EU-Korea summit in Seoul in March 2012, the two parties agreed to conduct regular policy dialogue, exchange information on their respective development programmes, and also to ‘coordinate their engagement in-country to increase their impact on poverty eradication’ (European Commission, Joint Press Statement, 2012).

  • 6  Development cooperation is a shared competence of the European Union and its Member States (albeit (...)

5In light of the increasing exchanges between the EU and Korea, this paper will analyse Korean development cooperation policy in order to gain a better understanding of how it relates to, and potentially differs from, EU development cooperation6. In the following sections, the paper first presents an overview of recent changes in the development assistance architecture, spurred by the emergence of new donors (Section 2). This is followed by a discussion of the rapid development experienced by South Korea over the last half century as it transitioned from a poor recipient to a Development Assistant Committee (DAC) donor (Section 3). Next, Section 4 outlines Korea’s development cooperation objectives, contrasting its preferred channels, types, and approaches with those of the EU. Subsequently, the paper analyses the recipients of South Korean aid, in terms of both partners and economic sectors, and raises possibilities for further cooperation. Section 5 assesses the participation of South Korea and the EU in South-South and triangular cooperation arrangements, while Section 6 presents some tentative conclusions.

2. A New Development Cooperation Architecture

6The development cooperation arena traditionally deals with developed countries and/or multilateral agencies (donors) assisting developing countries (recipients) in pursuing development, particularly the achievement of the MDGs. Parallel to this traditional approach to development cooperation, several emerging countries, such as Korea (before DAC membership), China, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, India, Kuwait and Brazil, among others (Kharas, 2007; IDP, 2012), have provided assistance to other developing countries for decades (Cabral e al., 2010; Denney et al., 2011; ECOSOC, 2008; Mawdsley, 2012; Woods, 2008). This emergence of new donors on the world stage has not only resulted in an increase in relevant actors but also in a diversification of development cooperation strategies. Walz and Ramachandran (2010) identify three distinct models of development cooperation and aid delivery (the DAC model, the Arab model and the Southern model), which do not necessarily converge. These models differ with respect to their preferred modalities of aid provision and sectors of emphasis. Within this complex scenario, Korea constitutes an interesting case, as it has tranitioned from a recipient to an emerging donor and, more recently (since 2010), a DAC member, in rapid succession.

7For a long time, the amount of aid provided by newly developing countries was quite modest. Over the past few years, however, the volume of their activities has increased significantly, coming to represent 10-12 per cent of total aid flows in 2009 (Muggah and Hamann, 2012). In 2009, for example, Brazil’s development assistance amounted to an estimated USD 362 million, provided mainly in the form of contributions to international organisations and technical cooperation, while China’s assistance, including grants, concessional and interest-free loans, reached USD 1.945 billion (IDP, 2012). The sheer volume of these flows makes these countries important players in development assistance, and correspondingly, increases their influence in the political arena.

8The participation of these new donors not only brings new challenges, but also new opportunities. Some traditional donors argue that emerging their emerging counterparts are increasing the debt burdens of the countries they offer aid, as well as lowering overall standards (Woods, 2008). In a balanced assessment, however, Ngaire Woods concluded that the emerging countries are not trying to establish new rules for development assistance. That said, by offering alternatives to developing countries, emerging donors are introducing competitive pressures into the existing system, thus weakening the bargaining power of the traditional donors and their corresponding ability to impose their standards. New donors also offer new opportunities, especially in a context emphasizing the building of partnerships and networks as highlighted in the Seoul Consensus and the Busan Declaration. This form of network governance opens up new opportunities for policy-makers to achieve their objectives (Slaughter, 2005; Slaughter and Zaring, 2006; Marx et al., 2011). Particularly relevant in the context of development cooperation are the opportunities inherent to triangular development cooperation partnerships, which consist of a traditional donor, a ‘new’ donor and a recipient state. This emerging form of cooperation is currently in the process of being implemented. Brazil, for example, has invested in more than 150 projects in partnership with Japan, US, Germany, France, Canada and Spain in recipient countries such as Haiti, Mozambique and Peru, among others (ABC, 2013). This new, networked global order (Slaughter, 2005) thus offers many opportunities to develop triangular cooperation wherein the new donors act as important network hubs linking other countries and regional organisations.

3. The Rise of Korea in Development Cooperation: From Recipient to Donor

9Korean development, in recent decades, has been impressive (Evans, 1995; Amsden, 2002). The country was devastated after the Korean War (1950-1953) but, in just fifty years, following a successful economic transformation, became a member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OEDC), figuring among the most developed nations around the world

10Post-war Korean economic development is, in part, due to well-managed development aid. For most of the post-war period, Korea was an aid recipient. The Korean government successfully utilised this financial assistance to overcome various domestic challenges through state-led projects designed to spur economic development (Kim J., 2011; Evans, 1995). According to Korean government estimates, the country received USD 12.7 billion between 1945 and the late 1990s, ‘which helped spur economic development and decrease poverty’ (OECD, 2008: 9). As illustrated by Figure 1, this aid was primarily provided by the United States, Japan and the European DAC members.Japanese loans issued in 1981 constituted the last significant aid assistance Korea received.

11Following decades of sustained economic growth, Korea became a member of the OECD in 1996 and, a decade later, applied to become a member of the OECD-DAC. Upon Korea’s request, in 2008 the DAC conducted a review of Korea’s development cooperation, with a view toward Korea attaining DAC membership. This review provided Korea with a set of recommendations intended to improve several aspects of its development cooperation system, including the creation of specific legislation to govern its Official Development Assistance (ODA), adjusting its aid architecture, formally and publically committing to ODA targets and integratingits grants and loans into one, clear country-level strategy, among others (OECD, 2008). In June 2009, the DAC visited Korea to verify whether its development cooperation programme met DAC standards and, on 25 November, the DAC welcomed Korea as a new member7.

Figure 1 ­ Net ODA Flows to South Korea,By Donor (Constant 2010 USD)

Figure 1 ­ Net ODA Flows to South Korea,By Donor (Constant 2010 USD)

Source: OECD, 2012

12Korea’s involvement in development assistance, however, began far prior to its DAC membership, with the provision of technical cooperation in the late 1970s, during which time Korea transferred its own development experience to developing countries (Chun et al., 2010, 790). In the late 1980s, Korea made a more concrete effort to broaden and increase its assistance programs, resulting in the creation of the Korea Eximbank’s Economic Development and Co-operation Fund (EDCF) in 1987 and the Korea International Co-operation Agency (KOICA) in 1991 (OECD, 2008).

13This rapid movement from recipient to DAC donor is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 plots Korean net ODA flows (the difference between donors’ gross disbursements of grants and loans minus Korean repayments the principals of earlier loans) from 1960 to 2000. At the beginning of the 1990s, net ODA flows to Korea became negative, indicating that the Korean repayments of previous loans exceeded the influx of assistance. Figure 3 illustrates the net disbursements from Korea (as a donor) to developing countries from 1987 to 2011. Note that such disbursements began modestly but, since the late 2000s, has been increasingly rapidly. In 2011, Korea net flows reached USD 1,248.32 million (or 0.12 per cent of Korean Gross National Income [GNI]).

Figure 2 ­ Total Net ODA Flows to South Korea (Constant 2010 USD)

Figure 2 ­ Total Net ODA Flows to South Korea (Constant 2010 USD)

Source: OECD, 2012

14Despite the fact that South Korean aid (as a percentage of GNI) is the lowest of all DAC members (Figure 4), the Korean rate of 0.12 per cent of GNI should not be underestimated. When,in 2006, the government announced an ODA/GNI target of 0.118 per cent by 2010 in its ‘Vision 2030’ (Kiyokazu, 2008), it was considered to be a huge challenge by its DAC peers (OECD, 2008). Korean ODA is increasing rapidly (see Figure 3), to the extent that it has almost matched DAC traditional members, such as Japan (0.18 per cent in 2011) and the US (0.20 per cent in 2011).

15Figure 3.1 ­ Korean ODA - Net Disbursements (Constant 2010 USD)

Figure 3.1 ­ Korean ODA - Net Disbursements (Constant 2010 USD)

Source: OECD

Figure 3.2 ­ Korea ODA (% GNI)

Figure 3.2 ­ Korea ODA (% GNI)

Source: OECD

Figure 4 ­ODA as Percentage of GNI, By Donor

Figure 4 ­ODA as Percentage of GNI, By Donor

Source: OECD

4. Development Strategies and Practices in Comparative Perspective

4.1. Objectives of Development Assistance

16The primary aim of the Korean government’s development assistance is poverty reduction and the promotion of sustainable development. In the words of President Lee, the country is ‘wholehearted commitment to pay back its “debts” to the world as an international donor’ (Kim S., 2011, 812). The intention of the Korean development assistance program to assist developing countries in pursuing developmental success are also be illustrated by statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade: ‘Korea is fully committed to supporting the global efforts to alleviate poverty, promote sustainable growth, address global challenges, and achieve the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDG)’8.

17As indicated by the above statement, the Korean assistance structure is composed of two main actors. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) is responsible for developing grant aid policy, which in turn is implemented by KOICA. Concessional loan policy, in contrast, falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance and is implemented by the Korean EDCF. Additionally, a further 30 ministries, agencies and municipalities are involved in providing grant aid in small amounts, mainly in the form of technical co-operation (OECD, 2008).

18The following sections compare South Korean and European Union development cooperation. Several EU member states are traditional DAC donors with long-term experiences to share with South Korea. In addition to the contributions of each member state, the EU itself was the third largest DAC member in 2010 (OECD, 2012) and is one of the most important international actors in development cooperation and sustainable development. Although Korea and the EU have different development assistance backgrounds, their development cooperation policies share several principles, including a primary focus on poverty eradication and the achievement of the MDGs.

  • 9  The Transparency Index is an attempt to measure the availability and accessibility of aid flow inf (...)
  • 10  The Commitment to Development Index, from the Centre for Global Development, scores governments on (...)

19In addition to comparing South Korean and EU development cooperation, the following sections will also highlight some criticisms raised in the literature regarding the South Korean assistance programme. Many of these criticisms, which emphasise the connection of development cooperation with strategic political and economic objectives, mirror those levied against other donors, including many OECD-DAC members. First of all, some authors have criticised Korea’s development assistance for being overly selective. Chun et al. (2010) note that poverty alleviation and the achievement of the MDGs are probably not the only objectives of Korea’s development cooperation policy, as a significant amount of the country’s ODA goes to relatively wealthy Asian countries where Korea has strategic economic interests (such as Sri Lanka and Indonesia, for example), instead of least developed countries. Another critical issue raised in the literature is the high volume of ODA to Iraq and Afghanistan (Chun et al., 2010; Kim S., 2011). Some authors suggest these flows have more to do with solidifying the Korean strategic alliance with the US, rather than promoting development and poverty eradication. A perceived lack of transparency in development assistance is also an issue of concern with respectto South Korea. The state was ranked 30thof 31 countries and multilateral agencies by the Transparency Index in Foreign Aid (Ghosh and Kharas, 2011)9 and ranks last on the 2012 Commitment to Development Index10.

4.2. Approach to Development Cooperation

20This section discusses the different approaches to development cooperation with reference to three key questions: Is development cooperation pursued via multilateral or bilateral channels? Is the assistance made via grants or loans? Is aid tied or untied?

21First, concerning the most appropriate “channels” for development cooperation, some authors (Kim S., 2011; Kharas and Rogerson, 2012; Keohane et al., 2009)argue that multilateralism offers some specific benefits. Multilateral channels facilitate better coordination of resources and can improve efficiency in spreading the aid burden, leveraging experience, expertise, geographic reach, and other assets that are better deployed through joint efforts (OECD, 2011). This channel may also be considered more neutral (Kim S., 2011, 804), as it limits the ability of domestic interests to influence assistance provision for political or commercial ends (Keohane et al., 2009). The multilateral aid shares of Korea and European Union institutions are presented on Figure 5, together with DAC member averages.

Figure 5 ­ Multilateral Aid Share

Figure 5 ­ Multilateral Aid Share

Source : OCDE

22Figure 5 indicates that, until the mid-1990s, Korea channeled its development cooperation mainly through multilateral organisations. In this period, South Korean assistance was primarily distributed by the World Bank and Regional Development Banks. For example, in 1990, 61 per cent of Korean multilateral assistance went through the World Bank, and 29 per cent through the Regional Development Banks. From the mid-1990s, however, Korea changed its profile, and has increased its aid disbursed through bilateral agreements. In the last decade, Korea’s multilateral aid, as a share of its total, has been below the average of DAC members (which is around 30 per cent), but the International Development Association (IDA) and other World Bank Institutions (at 35 per cent) are still the top destinations of Korean multilateral aid, followed by the Regional Development Banks ( 30 per cent, see Figure 6).

  • 11  See Milner and Tingley (2011) for more details on the principal-agent model.

23One possible explanation for the decline in multilateral Korean aid is that, within such organisations, the donor country (principal) is vulernable to losing control over its aid funds in favor of a multilateral actor (agent) (Milner and Tingley, 2011)11. Correspondingly, multilateral approaches can be difficult to implement, due to problems maintaining political or public support at home (Chun et al., 2010, 798). In the case of Korea, this switch from multilateral to bilateral channels is also associated with the creation of the Korean aid agencies (EDCF in 1987, and KOICA in 1991), which accounts for the sharp drop in multilateral aid in the early 1990s (see Figure 5). Korean government discourse reflects a recognition of the necessity to increase their multilateral contributions. Among goals of the EDCF, for example, is a commitment to ‘Promote global partnership with development institutions such as Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)’ (EDCF, 2010). Looking at Figure 5, however, there is little evidence of a change in favor of multilateral aid.

24With regards to the EU, the multilateral portion of its assistance is also low, an unsurprising reality given the EU itself is a supra-national organisation which receives significant funds from its member states. Looking at Figure 6, however, it is apparent that the DAC EU members provide a significant percentage of their aid, representing around 30 to 40 per cent of their total development assistance, through multilateral channels. Figure 7, indicates that the top institutional destination of the DAC EU members’ multilateral assistance is the EU (at 48 per cent). The primary destination of the EU institutions’ multilateral aid, in turn, is the United Nations and its associated agencies (42 per cent), followed by Regional Development Banks (11 per cent). The remaining 46 per cent of EU multilateral aid goes to other, smaller agencies (or are unspecified in the DAC dataset).

25Figure 6 – 2011 Percentage of Multilateral Flows by Destination

Figure 6 – 2011 Percentage of Multilateral Flows by Destination

Source: OECD

26Secondly, the discussion turns to the use of loans versus grants transfers in goods, services or cash for which no repayment is required. In a global context of highly indebted developing countries, grants are increasingly preferred as an instrument of development policy. Korean aid, however, is still characterised by significant reliance on concessional loans. As demonstrated by Figure 7, loans represented 65 per cent of the total Korean aid in 2000, compared to an average of 22% per cent for all DAC members and 11 per cent for EU donors. Although loans are a valid aid mechanism with which Korea itself experienced significant success (Kim S., 2011, 809), in the context of international efforts to ensure debt sustainability, particularly with respect to the least developed countries (LDCs), its reliance on loans as a donor has been met with concern. Korea is aware of this issue and has changedits profile in response. In 2012, the proportion of loans to grants in total Korean aid. That said, however, loans still represent 39 per cent of Korean aid, a high percentage in comparison with that of DAC EU members (15 per cent), or the EU, which, in 2010, provided 100 per cent of its aid in the form of grants.

Figure 7.1.: Grants x Loans 2000

Figure 7.1.: Grants x Loans 2000

Source: OECD

Figure 7.2.: Grants x Loans 2010

Figure 7.2.: Grants x Loans 2010

Source: OECD

27Finally, the issue of tied versus untied aid remains to be considered. “Tied” aid represents a form of aid wherein a donor country will only provide a loan or a grant to a recipient country if the recipient agrees to spend the money on goods and services produced in the donor country or a group of countries identified by the donor country. “Untied aid”, in contrast, has no geographical limitations or conditionalities. Due to these limitations, most experts agree that tied aid should be reduced, as it raises the cost of goods and services by an average of 15-30 per cent (OECD, 2008, 23).

28Some European countries, such as Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden, have already fully untied their bilateral aid programs, but as of 2010, DAC members, on average, still tied approximately 16 per cent of their funding (see Figure 8). Until 2006, almost all Korean bilateral aid was tied (for a total of 98 per cent in total aid in 2006). This high proportion of tied aid has been criticised not only for reducing the value and effectiveness of aid, but also for its propensity to neglect the ownership of recipient countries and inadvertently promote donor export interests (Chun et al., 2010).

29Recently, however, following DAC recommendations, Korea has made efforts to reduce tied aid to the LDCs, (OECD, 2008, 24). To that end, the Korean government has created a roadmap to untie 75 per cent of its overall ODA by 2015. In 2010, only 36 per cent of Korean aid was untied. This figure is still low when compared to the 2015 goal but represents clear progress when considered in light of Korea’s long-term aid trends prior to 2006.

30With respect to the European Union institutions, in 2010 54 per cent of the bilateral aid was untied. As data from previous years is unavailable, however, it is not possible to place this figure in long-term context. In any case, the figure indicates that 46 per cent of EU aid is still fully or partially tied, suggest that the EU may also make further improvements in its aid provision. The precise nature of this tied aid remains to be further investigated.

31Figure 8.1.: Tying Status of Bilateral Aid – Korean ODA by Tying Status

Figure 8.1.: Tying Status of Bilateral Aid – Korean ODA by Tying Status

Source: OECD

32Figure 8.2.: Tying Status of Bilateral Aid – ODA by Tying Status (2000)

Figure 8.2.: Tying Status of Bilateral Aid – ODA by Tying Status (2000)

Source: OECD

Figure 8.3.: Tying Status of Bilateral Aid – ODA by Tying Status (2010)

Figure 8.3.: Tying Status of Bilateral Aid – ODA by Tying Status (2010)

Source: OECD

33Looking at these three aspects of development cooperation, it is clear that, with the exception of the tied nature of its aid, Korea does not differ significantly from the so-called DAC model. Korea provides less multilateral aid than the DAC average, but more than the DAC without EU member states. With respect to the the distribution of aid between grants and loans, Korea provides fewer grants than the DAC average, but a higher percentage of grants (in 2010) than many major traditional donors, such as Japan.

4.3. Recipients of Korean Aid

34As illustrated in Figure 9, Korea’s aid is primarily focused on Asia, especially Iraq, Vietnam, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. In 2005, for instance, 81 per cent of total Korean aid was addressed to Asia. Although, to a certain extent, this focus is explained by Korea’s own geographical location, some authors have criticised this Asian emphasis, for ostensibly priviledging commerical interests over genuine poverty alleviation. Vietnam, Indonesia and Sri Lanka are all possess fast-growing economies and are not among the world’s most impoverished nations (Chun et al., 2010). Similarly, the high amount of aid marked for post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan has been criticised as instrumentally motivated – driven more by a desire to maintain the Korean strategic security partnership with the United States than a commitment to poverty reduction (Chun et al., 2010; Kim S., 2011).

35In recent years, however, Korea begun to balance its aid contributions to other parts of the world, notably Africa. In 2010, the Asian portion of total Korean aid was reduced to 65 per cent, while aid to Africa increased to 16 per cent, followed by that to the Americas, at 7 per cent. The recent Korean presence in Africa seems to note a continuation of this upward trend, with recent reports highlighting the increased visibility of Korea in both Uganda specifically and Africa as a whole (Mungcal, 2012). This increase in aid to Africa was expected, as Korea made a specifica commitment to it in its 2006 Initiative for African Development (OECD, 2008: 16). When considering the top African aid destinations (Angola, Ghana and Egypt), however, are all oil producers, the question is raised as to whether this strategy, too, does not have the underlying motive of securing access to natural resources.

36Figure 9.1: Korean ODA by Region (Constant 2010 USD)

Figure 9.1: Korean ODA by Region (Constant 2010 USD)

Source: OECD and World Bank Development Indicators

Figure 9.2: Korean ODA by Region (2010)

Figure 9.2: Korean ODA by Region (2010)

Source: OECD and World Bank Development Indicators

Figure 9.3: Top Recipient Countries (sum 2000-2009)

Figure 9.3: Top Recipient Countries (sum 2000-2009)

Source: OECD and World Bank Development Indicators

  • 12  Least Developed Countries are states listed by the United Nations on the basis of the criteria tha (...)

37Apart from Asia and Africa, Korea has also increased its aid to the LDCs and low income countries (LIC)s, in accordance with the broad goals of poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs. The figures for Korean aid to LDC and LIC countries12 are highlighted in Figure 10, and compared with overall aid to Africa. Since 2000, Korea has increased aid to LDC and LIC countries at a rate similar to that to Africa. In 2000, 44 per cent of Korea aid was addressed to LDC and LIC countries. This proportion oscillated in the mid-2000s but has since rapidly increased, reaching 56 per cent in 2010. With this improvement, the portion of Korean aid directed to LDC and LIC countries is greater than the share, on average, of all DAC members (41 per cent) for the same timeframe. These figures thus place the aforementioned criticism of the potential commercial focus of Korean aid in another light entirely.

38It should be noted, however, that Korea needs to be careful with respect to its provision of concessional loans to the LCDs. As demonstrated by Figure 11, the proportion of aid provided in the form of loans to LDCs and LICs countries remains high. The graph indicates that while the loan shares to each category of states have oscillated during the last decade, the figures for LIC countries have decreased more rapidly than those of the LDCs (despite a setback in the LICs loan share since 2008).

39Figure 10.1. ­ Korean ODA to Africa and LDC+LIC (Million constant 2010 USD) –

Figure 10.1. ­ Korean ODA to Africa and LDC+LIC (Million constant 2010 USD) –

Source: OECD

40Figure 10.2. ­ Korean ODA to Africa and LDC+LIC (in percentage)

Figure 10.2. ­ Korean ODA to Africa and LDC+LIC (in percentage)

Source: OECD

41Figure 10.3. ­ DAC ODA to Africa and LDC+LIC (in percentage)

Figure 10.3. ­ DAC ODA to Africa and LDC+LIC (in percentage)

Source: OECD

42Figure 11 ­ Korean Loan Share to LDC and LIC countries (in percentage)

Figure 11 ­ Korean Loan Share to LDC and LIC countries (in percentage)

Source: OECD

43This analysis indicates that South Korean development assistance still seems to be strongly connected with commercial and political objectives such as security and access to oil. That said, however, the share of Korean assistance provided to the poorest states has increased, with figures for 2010 demonstrating that the Korean share of aid to LDCs and LICs exceeds the EU and DAC members’ average. Building upon this analysis of the geographic destinations of Korean aid, the following section examines the allocation of Korean aid by sectors.

4.4. Aid By Sector

44This section focuses on the sectors to which Korea supplies aid. DAC members are currently attempting to increase aid effectiveness through a ‘division of labour’, wherein each donor country concentrates its assistance on a few sectors. Korea committed to focus on seven sectors: education, health, governance, rural development, information and communication technology, industry and energy, the environment and gender (OECD, 2008, 17). Korean ODA from 2006-2010 for each of these seven sectors is presented by Figure 12. Due to a high level of investment, this graph also includes an extra sector, transport and storage. The graphs show a clear focus on education, health, and transport and storage. Figure 13 highlights education and health, demonstrating that Korean performance in these sectors is higher than that of the EU and the average of DAC members.

45It is interesting to note that the third sector – transport and storage – to which, since 2006, Korea has most intensified its assistance is not included in its list of focus sectors. The high amount of investment in economic infrastructure, such as transport and storage, stems from its centrality to Korea’s own development experience and the corresponding belief that economic infrastructure and development are mutually reinforcing (Kim S., 2011). Korea’s investment in economic infrastructure, however, is to the detriment of Korea’s other sectors of commitment,such as gender equality, rural development and environmental protection. This has to potential to create a skewed investment structure not only with respect to Korea’s own aid, but also in terms of the overall division of labour in development cooperation forged with other donors.

Figure 12 ­ Korean Aid by Sector (Constant 2010 USD)

Figure 12 ­ Korean Aid by Sector (Constant 2010 USD)

Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System

Figure 13.1 ­ Korean ODA in Education

Figure 13.1 ­ Korean ODA in Education

Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System

Figure 13.2 ­ Korean ODA in Health

Figure 13.2 ­ Korean ODA in Health

Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System

46Concerning environmental protection, developed signatories to the 1992 Rio Conventions committed to assisting developing countries in implementing the agreements. As illustrated by Figure 14, which comparies Korea’s environmental aid performance with that of other DAC members, Korean assistance on environmental issues has traditionally constituted a small part of the Korean aid programme. Overall, the share of Korean assistance dedicated to environmental issues, ranging from 1-1.5 per cent of Korean ODA, has been below the average of DAC members (2-5 per cent), European Union institutions (2-4 per cent), and significantly lower than top environmental donor countries, such as United Kingdom, France and Japan.

Figure 14 – Environmental Share of Assistance

Figure 14 – Environmental Share of Assistance

Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System

47Other focus sectors that have received a comparatively small amount of Korean assistance are gender equality and rural development. Figure 15 shows the figures for Korea, the EU and the DAC members’ average for each of these sectors from 2006 to 2010. With respect to women’s empowerment, the figures for Korea are minimal, and indicate no clear trend. Rural development, however, has seen a marked increase over the last few years.

Figure 15.1 ­ ODA to Women’s Equality Organisations and Institutions (in percentage)

Figure 15.1 ­ ODA to Women’s Equality Organisations and Institutions (in percentage)

Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System

Figure 15.2 ­ ODA to Rural Development ­ Women’s Equality (in percentage)

Figure 15.2 ­ ODA to Rural Development ­ Women’s Equality (in percentage)

Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System

48From a more general perspective, the notion of a developmental division of labour between donors requires further analysis by both the EU and Korea, and possibly other donors, in order to improve their cooperation. The OECD-DAC has recommended that each donor country increase its aid effectiveness by concentrating its efforts on fewer sectors (OECD, 2008). Similarly, in the EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy, the European Commission has established eleven guiding principles that call on member states to concentrate their development activities on a limited number of recipient sectors, selected in accordance with the comparative advantage of donor countries as recognised by both recipients and other donors (European Commission, 2007). Available evidence indicates, however, that this division of labour has not yet materialised. Figure 16 plots the number of recipient countries and sectors assisted by the EU and Korea, respectively, from 2006 to 2010. These figures represent the sum of sectors assisted by a donor in each recipient country. The figures for Korea indicate that while it reduced the number of sectors/country aided from 2007-2009, in 2010, the sum of all sectors assisted skyrocketed to 1977 across all recipient countries. In the European case, the figures show a steep overall increase from 2006 to 2010.

Figure 16 ­ Total Number of Recipient Countries and Sectors Assisted by EU and Korea

Figure 16 ­ Total Number of Recipient Countries and Sectors Assisted by EU and Korea

Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System

49Lastly, another facet of donor assistance is humanitarian aid. As shown in Figure 17, Korea’s humanitarian aid saw a steep increase from 2000 to 2008. In 2008, an absolute peak of USD 56 million was designated for this purpose, addressed mainly to China, Iraq and Myanmar for reconstruction and relief. In terms of percentage, Korean humanitarian aid was at a pinnacle in 2005, with 5.6 per cent of the total ODA allocated to humanitarian aid, a figure that remains somewhat modest when compared to that of the EU (11 per cent). Since 2009, however, Korean humanitarian aid has experienced setbacks as it currently accounts for only 1 per cent of the total ODA.

Figure 17.1. – Korean Humanitarian Aid (Constant 2010 USD)

Figure 17.1. – Korean Humanitarian Aid (Constant 2010 USD)

Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System

Figure 17.2. – Korean Humanitarian Aid (in percentage)

Figure 17.2. – Korean Humanitarian Aid (in percentage)

Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System

50As discussed above, this section demonstrates that Korea has focused its aid on three main sectors: education, health and transport and storage. The next section assesses Korean aid in comparison with other DAC and non-DAC countries, as well as potential future cooperation between Korea and EU.

5. Discussion

51This section places the paper’s findings in a broader perspective, and assesses to what degree Korea’s development cooperation policy fits the profile of a traditional DAC member. It then goes on to discuss the prospects for future collaboration between Korea and other DAC members, and the EU in particular, in the context of new forms of triangular cooperation.

  • 13  We performed a K-means clustering. Grants are significant at 5 per cent. Other variables significa (...)

52Firstly, as discussed in sections 2 and 3, Korea developed rapidly and became a DAC member recently. This section aims to situate Korean development cooperation in the wider context of development cooperation models more generally. Does Korea adhere to the traditional DAC model (Walz and Ramachandran, 2010; Zimmermann and Smith, 2011)? Cluster analysis is used to argue that Korea follows the traditional DAC model13. This analysis is based on an examination of the four aspects of development cooperation discussed above: ODA/GNI, multilateral share, grants share, and the percentage of aid sent to the poorest states (LDCs and LICs). These variables have already been used by other scholars to compare donors development cooperation systems (ECOSOC, 2008; OECD, 2008; Walz and Ramchandran, 2010; Zimmerman and Smith, 2011). These variables were also selected in order to maximise the number of countries included in the analysis. As such, the analysis intends to shed light on the nature of Korea as a development donor, through an evaluation of its similarities with other countries, on the basis of the four characteristics identified above.

53The previous sections presented several aspects of Korean development cooperation policy. First, it was shown that Korean ODA/GNI is the lowest among DAC members, yet not so different from other traditional DAC members, such as the US and Japan. The paper also found that Korea relies on multilateral channels for the provision of aid less than the DAC average. Similarly, it was demonstrated that Korea offers fewer grants in comparison to loans, as a portion of total aid, than the DAC members on average. Lastly, it was shown that Korea allocates significant amounts of aid to LDCs and LICs.

54In order to make a broader assessment, Korea’s performance in each of these four categories is compared to 45 other countries, calculated on the basis of data available in the OECD-DAC database. Unfortunately, this database only provides data for 45 countries (23 DAC and 22 non-DAC members) and does not include the data for important emerging Southern donors such as China, Brazil, India and South Africa. For each of the four variables, in order to minimise the effects of yearly fluctuation, the average of the last five years (2007-2011) was calculated. For 43 of the 45 countries, data was available for each of the four variables. The cluster analysis indicates that three main groups may be identified (see Table 1). Korea belongs to the second group, characterised by a high grant share, low multilateral share, high ODA/GNI, and moderate LDC/LIC share. The majority of DAC members belong to this group, as do other OECD members that do not belong to the DAC, such as Iceland and Israel. In this sense, the analysis indicates that Korea has become a traditional DAC donor, supporting the conclusion by Kang et al. (2011). Kang et al. (2011) compared Korean development assistance in the period 2002-2006 to Japan’s development assistance in the 1980s, demonstratingthat Korea initially followed a trajectory similar to that of Japan, and later becoming a more traditional DAC donor.

Table 1: Classification of Donors According to Grant Share, Multilateral Share, ODA/GNI and the Share to LDC and LIC.

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

Very High grant share**
High multilateral share*
Low ODA/GNI*
Low LDC/LIC share*

High grant share**
Low multilateral share*

High ODA/GNI*
Moderate LDC/LIC share*

Moderate grant share**
Moderate multilateral share*

Moderate ODA/GNI*
High LDC/LIC share*

Austria

DAC

Australia

DAC

Ireland

DAC

Greece

DAC

Belgium

DAC

Portugal

DAC

Italy

DAC

Canada

DAC

Lithuania

non-DAC

Bulgaria

non-DAC

Denmark

DAC

Thailand

non-DAC

Cyprus

non-DAC

Finland

DAC

Czech Republic

non-DAC

France

DAC

Estonia

non-DAC

Germany

DAC

Hungary

non-DAC

Japan

DAC

Latvia

non-DAC

Korea

DAC

Malta

non-DAC

Luxembourg

DAC

Poland

non-DAC

Netherlands

DAC

Romania

non-DAC

New Zealand

DAC

Russia

non-DAC

Norway

DAC

Slovak Republic

non-DAC

Spain

DAC

Slovenia

non-DAC

Sweden

DAC

Switzerland

DAC

United Kingdom

DAC

United States

DAC

Chinese Taipei

non-DAC

Iceland

non-DAC

Israel

non-DAC

Liechtenstein

non-DAC

Turkey

non-DAC

United Arab Emirates

non-DAC

* significant at 1%.

** significant at 5%.

55Second, even before it became a DAC member, Korea was recognised as an important actor in South-South Cooperation (SSC). The country was the fifth largest Southern development contributor in 2006 (ECOSOC, 2008,11), performing assistance through technical cooperation and program grants, bilateral loans, and other kinds of assistance, primarily to neighbouring Asian states, as highlighted above. The Korean allocation to SSC in 2006 was estimated to be 10 per cent of all Korean cooperation (ECOSOC, 2008,,19). Especially notable is Korea’s commitment to 100 per cent debt relief to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) (ECOSOC, 2008, 13).

56More recently, Korea has also seemed to invest in triangular cooperation (ECOSOC, 2008)between one donor from the global North, one from the global South and one recipient, aimed to provide assistance to this recipient country. In this kind of cooperation, the donor from the global South usually provides assistance in the form of its particular expertise and experience in the relevant sector of development, financially supported by the donor from the global North. For example, at the High Level Event on SSC and Capacity Development in March 2010, the Korean government shared its experience in implementing the Knowledge Sharing Program, which aims to assist the capacity-building efforts of developing countries (EDCF, 2010).

  • 14  See, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, ODA/Development Cooperation page http://www.m (...)

57Participation in SSC and triangular cooperation seems to be a commitment of the South Korea government. As stated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Korea aims to make ‘the best use of its unique development experience’ and ‘exert every effort to make meaningful contributions to the international community by playing a bridging role between developing and developed countries’14. This understanding of Korea’s role in SSC is shared by several authors. For example, Jerve (2007, 7) states that ‘the Korean experience is relevant for shaping development policies as well as how to make best use of aid’. The author also argues that ‘Korea can play a crucial role in bridging the gap between donor countries and developing partners by sharing their development experience with the help of aid’ (Jerve, 2007,8). The South Korean commitment with SSC was further reinforced its decision to join the Building Block Proposal on South-South and Triangular Cooperation, presented at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) in Busan, 2011. The outcome document of the HLF4 calls for the development community to deepen efforts to maximise the impact of this modality of aid, strengthen its institutions, and scale-up knowledge sharing in order to adapt and learn from these experiences (HLF4, 2011).

58Similar to Korea, the EU and some of its member states, such as Finland, France, Germany, Spain and Sweden, have been closely involved in triangular development cooperation as partners from the global North (ECOSOC, 2008,14). The EU also supports SSC and triangular cooperation, as stated by the EC in its Agenda for Change (2011), and joined the Building Block Proposal at HLF4.

59At this stage, it is difficult to empirically assess SSC and triangular cooperation due to a complete lack of available data. Korea, as all other DAC members, reports its development assistance in terms of ODA flows to the DAC. The DAC database compiles the assistance flows from all DAC members to all developing countries. The database, however, does not separately report on the participation of the DAC members in triangular cooperation. Currently, there is no institution that coordinates, analyses and disseminates data related to triangular cooperation.

60Although this lack of data makes assessing SSC and triangular cooperation difficult, it may be argued that the context offers several opportunities for EU and South Korea collaboration. Figure 9 shows the number of countries and sectors commonly assisted by Korea and the EU from 2006 to 2010 ( i.e. the countries and sectors assisted by Korea and EU separately). Figure 18 shows the subset of countries and sectors that are common to the two donors. These shared countries and sectors represent opportunities for collaboration.

61The number of common countries/sectors have increased since 2006, representing 10 to 16 per cent of all countries/sectors assisted by the EU. For South Korea, these common countries/sectors represent 19 to 31 per cent of all those aided. In 2010, for example, the 603 common sectors assisted by the EU and Korea constituted 14 per cent of the 3713 countries/sectors assisted by the EU and 19 per cent of the 1977 countries/sectors assisted by Korea. As such, it seems that the trend is moving in the opposite direction of that proposed in the “division of labour” guidelines discussed in the previous section. That said, of course, if one aims to promote triangular cooperation, such overlap is inevitable and to a degree beneficial. This overlap also shows that there are real opportunities for triangular cooperation. For example, in 2010, both the EU and Korea assisted Uganda and Kenya with agricultural development. If the EU and Korea share information on their respective projects, the donors could better coordinate their efforts and increase their aid effectiveness in these countries. Mozambique in 2010 constitutes yet another example of this potential for collaboration, wherein both the EU and Korea invested in agricultural development. Such practices also create potential opportunities for collaboration with other new emerging donors, such as Brazil, that have also invested in the agricultural sector in Lusophone Africa (Muggah and Hamann, 2012; Vieira and Alden, 2011) More generally, policies intended to promote private sector development a key objective of Millenium Development Goal Eight might be especially relevant for strengthened cooperation. Given Korea’s successful experience with private sector development in spurring economic development (Evans, 1995) it has the potential to offer unique expertise in triangular cooperation projects.

Figure 18.1 ­ Common Countries and Sectors Assisted by Korea and the European Union ­ Number of Receipient Countries and Sectors commonly assisted by EU and Korea

Figure 18.1 ­ Common Countries and Sectors Assisted by Korea and the European Union ­ Number of Receipient Countries and Sectors commonly assisted by EU and Korea

Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System, 2012

Figure 18.2 ­ Common Countries and Sectors Assisted by Korea and the European Union ­ Percentage of the Total Number of Receipient Countries and Sectors assisted by EU and Korea that are commonly assisted by both (EU and Korea)

Figure 18.2 ­ Common Countries and Sectors Assisted by Korea and the European Union ­ Percentage of the Total Number of Receipient Countries and Sectors assisted by EU and Korea that are commonly assisted by both (EU and Korea)

Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System, 2012

Conclusion

62The paper has analysed Korea’s development cooperation policies of Korea in the wider context of the on-going reconfiguration of the donor landscape.

63In a way, Korea offers an unique case. As a recipient country, it made good use of foreign aid in order to promote economic and social development. Today, Korea figures among the most developed countries in the world. Its unique experience can be used to strengthen international efforts to eradicate poverty and achieve the MDGs. The paper has also mapped and analysed the main characteristics of Korean development cooperation policy, first introducing the objectives of Korean development cooperation. Next, it discussed different approaches toward development cooperation, with specific reference to whether aid is tied, the use of grants versus loans, and the use of multilateral aid channels in comparison with bilateral channels. The paper then went on to analyse the destinations of Korean aid with respect to both geography and sector.

64As a new donor, Korean development cooperation policy has undergone marked changes in its early history, generating some early criticism which, to a degree, has been addressed by the South Korean authorities. First, with respect to Korea’s ostensible focus on Asia, one can observe that although the share of Korean assistance provided to Asian countries is still high (65 per cent), the share of Korean aid addressed to Africa and the LDCs countries has increased consistently since the early 2000s. Second, Korea has changed its policy on the use of concessional loans (versus grants). Although the percentage of loans to grants is still quite high, this percenage dropped from 65 to 39 per cent in a single decade. Third, the concession of tied aid has also been reduced significantly and the Korean government has created a plan to untie 75 per cent of its overall ODA by 2015. Overall, the analysis shows that Korea is becoming a traditional DAC donor, following a similar trajectory to that of Japan.

65The analysis also indicates that Korea is not concentrating – as would be expected following recent agreements on the division of labour in development cooperation – its aid on specific countries and sectors. Hence, as Korea spreads its aid over a large number of countries and sectors, much remains to be done in this regard. The OECD-DAC is currently engaged in efforts to achieve a better division of labour, recommending that each donor concentrate on fewer countries and sectors to increase aid effectiveness. This objective has not yet been achieved, and emprical analysis actually suggests that development trends are moving in the other direction. Notwithstanding that more attention should be paid to this issue, it should be noted that some overlap in the provision of development assistance is not necessarily detrimental, particularly in a context aiming to promote triangular cooperation. For triangular cooperation to be successful, minimal overlap in countries and sectors is actually required, as argued in the final section.

Top of page

Bibliography

DOI are automaticaly added to references by Bilbo, OpenEdition's Bibliographic Annotation Tool.
Users of institutions which have subscribed to one of OpenEdition freemium programs can download references for which Bilbo found a DOI in standard formats using the buttons available on the right.
Format
APA
MLA
Chicago
The Bibliographic Export Service is accessible via institutions subscribing to one OpenEdition freemium programs.
If you wish your institution to become a subscriber to one OpenEdition freemium programs and thus benefit from our services, please write to: access@openedition.org.

Amsden, A. (2002) The Rise of ‘The Rest’: Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Format
APA
MLA
Chicago
The Bibliographic Export Service is accessible via institutions subscribing to one OpenEdition freemium programs.
If you wish your institution to become a subscriber to one OpenEdition freemium programs and thus benefit from our services, please write to: access@openedition.org.

Bartels, L. (2008) ‘The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union’ in Cremona, M. (ed.), Developments in EU External Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
DOI : 10.1093/ejil/chm042

Format
APA
MLA
Chicago
The Bibliographic Export Service is accessible via institutions subscribing to one OpenEdition freemium programs.
If you wish your institution to become a subscriber to one OpenEdition freemium programs and thus benefit from our services, please write to: access@openedition.org.

Chun, H., E. N. Munyi. and H. Lee (2010) ‘South Korea as an Emerging Donor: Challenges and Changes on its Entering OECD/DAC’, Journal of International Development, 22(6), pp. 788-802, http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/jid.1723
DOI : 10.1002/jid.1723

Council of the European Union (2009) Council Conclusions on Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), (Council of the European Union: Brussels),http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/regional-cooperation/support-regional-integration/asem/documents/council_conclusions_17th_november_2009.pdf (accessed 4 April 2013).

Council of the European Union (2012) EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, (Council of the European Union: Brussels) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131181.pdf (accessed 4 April 2013).

Economic Development Cooperation Fund (2010) EDCF Annual Report 2010, (Ministry of Strategy and Finance, International Economic Affaffairs Bureau, Development Cooperation Division: Gwacheon City),http://www.edcfkorea.go.kr/edcfeng/index.jsp (accessed 4 April 2013).

ECOSOC (2008) Trends in South-South and Triangular Development Cooperation,Report of the Asia Pacific regional DCF, 21-28 October 2008, (Bangkok:United Nations Economic and Social Council),http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/pdf/dcf%20bangkok%20meeting.pdf (accessed 2 April 2013).

European Commission (2003) The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels, 10 September 2003, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0526:FIN:EN:PDF (accessed 4 April 2013).

European Commission (2006) ‘The European Consensus on Development’, Official Journal of the European Union, 24 February 2006,(European Commission: Brussels),http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/european_consensus_2005_en.pdf (accessed 4 April 2013).

European Commission (2007) ‘EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy’, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Brussels, 28 February 2007,http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/general_development_framework/r13003_en.htm (accessed 4 April 2013).

European Commission (2008) ‘Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’, Official Journal of the European Union, 30 March 2010,(European Commission: Brussels),http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:en:PDF (accessed 4 April 2013).

European Commission (2010) ‘Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union’, Official Journal of the European Union, 30 March 2010,(European Commission: Brussels),http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0013:0046:en:PDF(accessed 4April 2013).

European Commission (2011a) Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 13 October 2011, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0637:FIN:EN:PDF (accessed 4 April 2013).

European Commission (2011b) Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission Support to Respect of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Directorate–General Development and Cooperation, Evaluation Unit, (European Commission: Brussels), http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2011/1298_docs_en.htm(accessed 4 April 2013).

European Commission (2011c) The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 13 October 2011,http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/delivering-aid/budget-support/documents/future_eu_budget_support_en.pdf (accessed 4 April 2013).

European Commission (2012) Republic of Korea-EU Summit – Joint Press Statement, Brussels, 28 March 2012, Meno 12/224, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-224_en.htm(accessed 2 April 2013).

European Parliament (2012) The Role of BRICS in the Developing World, Directorate-General for External Policies, (European Parliament: Brussels),http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/1_avrupa_birligi/1_9_politikalar/1_9_8_dis_politika/The_role_of_BRICS_in_the_developing_world.pdf (accessed 4 April 2012).

Evans, P. (1995) Embedded Autonomy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Format
APA
MLA
Chicago
The Bibliographic Export Service is accessible via institutions subscribing to one OpenEdition freemium programs.
If you wish your institution to become a subscriber to one OpenEdition freemium programs and thus benefit from our services, please write to: access@openedition.org.

Ghosh, A. and H. Kharas (2011) ‘The Money Trail: Ranking Donor Transparency in Foreign Aid’, World Development 39(11), pp. 1918-1929, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.07.026.
DOI : 10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.07.026

Group of 77 (G-77) (2008) Yamoussoukro Consensus on South-South Cooperation, Twelfth Session of the Intergovernmental Follow-up and Cooperation Committee on Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries, 10-13 June 2008, (Yamoussoukro: G-77 secretariat), http://www.g77.org/ifcc12/Yamoussoukro_Consensus.pdf (accessed 2 April 2013).

Hackenesch, C. (2011) European Good Governance Policies Meet China in Africa: Insights from Angola and Ethiopia, Working Paper no. 10, (Bonn: European Development Co-operation to 2020), http://www.edc2020.eu/fileadmin/publications/EDC2020_-_Working_Paper_No._10_-_European_Good_Governance_Policies_Meet_China_in_Africa__Insights_From_Angola
_and_Ethiopia.pdf
(accessed 4 April 2013).

HLF4 (Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness) (2011) South-South and Triangular Cooperation: Unlocking the Potential of Horizontal Partnerships for Better Development Outcomes, 29 Nov. – 1 Dec. 2011, Busan, Korea,http://www.southsouth.info/page/inputs-for-busan-hlf4 (accessed 2 April 2013).

Jerve, A.M. (2007) Asian Models for Aid: Is There a Non-Western Approach to Development Assistance? Summary record of seminar held in Oslo, December 2006, Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI Report R 2007: 12) 9 p., http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?2767=asian-models-for-aid (accessed 22 April 2013)

International Development Policy (2012) ‘Infographic Section’, International Development Policy: Emerging Economies and Global Policies, No.3, (Geneva: The Graduate Institute Publications, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 178-206. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/poldev.1098

Format
APA
MLA
Chicago
The Bibliographic Export Service is accessible via institutions subscribing to one OpenEdition freemium programs.
If you wish your institution to become a subscriber to one OpenEdition freemium programs and thus benefit from our services, please write to: access@openedition.org.

Kang, S. J., H. Lee and B. Park (2011) ‘Does Korea Follow Japan in Foreign Aid?: Relationships Between Aid and Foreign Investment’, Japan and the World Economy, 23(1), pp.19-27, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.japwor.2010.06.001
DOI : 10.1016/j.japwor.2010.06.001

Kharas, H. (2007) ‘The New Reality of Aid’, paper presented at Brookings Blum Roundtable 2007,http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2007/8/aid kharas/08aid_kharas.pdf (accessed4 April 2013).

Kharas, H. and A. Rogerson (2012) Horizon 2025: Creative Destruction in the Aid Industry, Research report (London: Overseas Development Institute),http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7723.pdf (accessed 4 April 2013).

Format
APA
MLA
Chicago
The Bibliographic Export Service is accessible via institutions subscribing to one OpenEdition freemium programs.
If you wish your institution to become a subscriber to one OpenEdition freemium programs and thus benefit from our services, please write to: access@openedition.org.

Keohane, R.O., S. Macedo and A. Moravcsik (2009) ‘Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism’, International Organization, 63(1), pp. 1-31, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090018
DOI : 10.1017/S0020818309090018

Format
APA
MLA
Chicago
The Bibliographic Export Service is accessible via institutions subscribing to one OpenEdition freemium programs.
If you wish your institution to become a subscriber to one OpenEdition freemium programs and thus benefit from our services, please write to: access@openedition.org.

Kim, J. (2011) ‘Foreign Aid and Economic Development: The Success Story of South Korea’, Pacific Focus, 26(2), pp. 260-286, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1976-5118.2011.01065.x
DOI : 10.1111/j.1976-5118.2011.01065.x

Kim, S. (2011) ‘Bridging Troubled Worlds? An Analysis of the Ethical Case for South Korea Aid’, Journal of International Development, 23(6), pp. 802-822, http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/jid.1811

Kiyokazu, K. (2008) ‘Reality of Aid 2008 Country Report: Republic of Korea, The Reality of Aid, (Quezon City: The Reality of Aid) http://www.realityofaid.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Reality-of-Aid-country-report.pdf (accessed 4 April 2013).

Marx, A., K. Kitaoka K. and A. MacGillivray (2011) ‘Private Sector Development, Knowledge Management and Networks’, Networks for Prosperity. Achieving Development Goals through Knowledge Sharing,(Vienna: UNIDO), pp.33-55, http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/News/2011/UN%20Report%20LowRes.pdf (accessed 4 April 2013).

Format
APA
MLA
Chicago
The Bibliographic Export Service is accessible via institutions subscribing to one OpenEdition freemium programs.
If you wish your institution to become a subscriber to one OpenEdition freemium programs and thus benefit from our services, please write to: access@openedition.org.

Mawdsley, E. (2012) ‘The Changing Geographies of Foreign Aid and Development Cooperation: Contributions from Gift Theory’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 37(2), pp. 256–272, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2011.00467.x
DOI : 10.1111/j.1475-5661.2011.00467.x

Format
APA
MLA
Chicago
The Bibliographic Export Service is accessible via institutions subscribing to one OpenEdition freemium programs.
If you wish your institution to become a subscriber to one OpenEdition freemium programs and thus benefit from our services, please write to: access@openedition.org.

Milner, H. V. and D.H. Tingley (2011) ‘The Choice for Multilateralism: Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy’, APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1900147 (accessed 2 April 2013).
DOI : 10.1007/s11558-012-9153-x

Format
APA
MLA
Chicago
The Bibliographic Export Service is accessible via institutions subscribing to one OpenEdition freemium programs.
If you wish your institution to become a subscriber to one OpenEdition freemium programs and thus benefit from our services, please write to: access@openedition.org.

Muggah, R. and E.P. Hamann (2012) ‘Brazil’s Generous Diplomacy: Friendly Dragon or Paper Tiger?’, International Development Policy: Aid, Emerging Economies and Global Policies, No.3, (Geneva: The Graduate Institute Publications, Basingstoke:Palgrave Macmillan), http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/poldev.1009.
DOI : 10.4000/poldev.1009

Mungcal, I. (2012) ‘For South Korea, Aid to Uganda Marks a Trend’, Devex Publications, http://www.devex.com/en/news/south-korea-and-its-oda-spending-in-uganda/78856. (accessed 4 April 2013).

OECD (2008) Development Cooperation of the Republic of Korea: DAC Special Review, (Paris: OECD), http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/42347329.pdf (accessed 2 April 2013).

OECD (2011) DAC Report on Multilateral Aid (Paris: OECD), http://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/49014277.pdf (accessed 2 April 2013).

OECD (2012) European Union: Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review 2012, (Paris: OECD), http://www.oecd.org/development/peer-reviews/50155818.pdf (accessed 2April 2013).

Format
APA
MLA
Chicago
The Bibliographic Export Service is accessible via institutions subscribing to one OpenEdition freemium programs.
If you wish your institution to become a subscriber to one OpenEdition freemium programs and thus benefit from our services, please write to: access@openedition.org.

Slaughter, A.-M. (2005) A New World Order, (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
DOI : 10.2307/20048208

Format
APA
MLA
Chicago
The Bibliographic Export Service is accessible via institutions subscribing to one OpenEdition freemium programs.
If you wish your institution to become a subscriber to one OpenEdition freemium programs and thus benefit from our services, please write to: access@openedition.org.

Slaughter, A.-M. and D. Zaring (2006) ‘Networking Goes International: An Update’, Annual Review of Law and Social Science, pp. 211-229, http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.1.041604.120026.
DOI : 10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.1.041604.120026

UNIDO and Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (2011) Networks for Prosperity: Achieving Development Goals through Knowledge Sharing (Vienna: UNIDO), http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/News/2011/UN Report LowRes.pdf (accessed 4 April 2013).

Vieira, M.-A. and C. Alden (2011) ‘India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA): South-South Cooperation and the Paradox of Regional Leadership’, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 17(4), pp. 507-528, http://journals.rienner.com/doi/abs/10.5555/1075-2846-17.4.507 (accessed 4 April 2012).

Walz, J. and V. Ramachandran (2010) ‘Brave New World: A Literature Review of Emerging Donors and the Changing Nature of Foreign Assistance’, Working Paper 273, (London: Center for Global Development),http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1425691 (accessed 2 April 2013).

Woods, N. (2008) ‘Whose Aid? Whose influence? China, Emerging Donors and the Silent Revolution in Development Assistance’, International Affairs, 84(6), pp. 1205–1221, http://dx.doi.org/0.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00765.x

Zimmermann, F.  and K. Smith (2011) ‘More Actors, More Money, More Ideas for International Development Co-operation’, Journal of International Development,23(5), pp. 722-738, http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/jid.1796

Other sources

ABC - Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (2013) ‘Projetos’. http://www.abc.gov.br

OECD, OECD.Stat Extracts http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx

Top of page

Notes

1  Art. 208(1) TFEU states: ‘Union policy in the field of development cooperation shall be conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action. The Union’s development cooperation policy and that of the Member States complement and reinforce each other.’; Art. 21 TEU.

2  European Commission, Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Increasing the Impact of EU Development: An Agenda for Change’, COM (2011) 673 final, Brussels, 13 October 2011.

3  Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’ (2006/C 46/01), 2006, § 7.

4  Council Of the European Union, Council Conclusions ‘EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’ Luxembourg, 25 June 2012.

5  Council Of the European Union, Council conclusions ‘The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries’ Brussels, 14 May 2012.

6  Development cooperation is a shared competence of the European Union and its Member States (albeit with the condition that the exercise of EU competence does not prevent the Member States from exercising theirs (Art. 4(4) TFEU), and strategies have been developed to ensure that the policies of the EU and the Member States are consistent and effective.

7  See http://www.oecd.org/dac/oecddevelopmentassistancecommitteedacwelcomeskoreanmembership.htm

8  Available at: http://www.mofat.go.kr/ENG/policy/oda (Accessed on 14 June 2012).

9  The Transparency Index is an attempt to measure the availability and accessibility of aid flow information in a timely, systematic and comparable manner. It rates 31 bilateral and multilateral donor agencies on six measures of transparency: membership in the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI); recording of project titles and descriptions; level of detail of project descriptions; reporting of aid delivery channels; completeness of project-level commitment data; and the share of net ODA that donors give to recipients with strong monitoring and evaluation frameworks.

10  The Commitment to Development Index, from the Centre for Global Development, scores governments on their assistance to poor countries on the basis of seven parameters: aid, trade, investment, migration, environment, security and technology. Available athttp://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/cdi/

11  See Milner and Tingley (2011) for more details on the principal-agent model.

12  Least Developed Countries are states listed by the United Nations on the basis of the criteria that they be poor (GNI per capita of less than USD 750), weak on human resources and economic vulnerable. The list includes 33 African countries, 14 Asian and one Latin American (Haiti). Low Income Countries are listed by the World Bank, and includes countries with a GNI per capita of USD 1025 or less. The list also includes African, Asian and Latin American states. Some countries (such as Benin and Congo Dem. Rep.) are listed both as LDCs and LICs, but the data presented on Figure 11 does not overlap (or ‘double-count’) the ODA received by these countries. The ODA to African countries that are on the list of LDCs and LICs in Figure 11, however, are included in both lines.

13  We performed a K-means clustering. Grants are significant at 5 per cent. Other variables significant at 1 per cent.

14  See, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, ODA/Development Cooperation page http://www.mofat.go.kr/ENG/policy/oda/index.jsp?menu=m_20_11 (accessed on 22 April 2013)

Top of page

List of illustrations

Title Figure 1 ­ Net ODA Flows to South Korea,By Donor (Constant 2010 USD)
Credits Source: OECD, 2012
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-1.png
File image/png, 56k
Title Figure 2 ­ Total Net ODA Flows to South Korea (Constant 2010 USD)
Credits Source: OECD, 2012
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-2.png
File image/png, 38k
Title Figure 3.1 ­ Korean ODA - Net Disbursements (Constant 2010 USD)
Credits Source: OECD
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-3.png
File image/png, 37k
Title Figure 3.2 ­ Korea ODA (% GNI)
Credits Source: OECD
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-4.png
File image/png, 32k
Title Figure 4 ­ODA as Percentage of GNI, By Donor
Caption Source: OECD
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-5.png
File image/png, 64k
Title Figure 5 ­ Multilateral Aid Share
Credits Source : OCDE
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-6.png
File image/png, 64k
Title Figure 6 – 2011 Percentage of Multilateral Flows by Destination
Credits Source: OECD
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-7.png
File image/png, 30k
Title Figure 7.1.: Grants x Loans 2000
Credits Source: OECD
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-8.png
File image/png, 27k
Title Figure 7.2.: Grants x Loans 2010
Credits Source: OECD
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-9.png
File image/png, 26k
Title Figure 8.1.: Tying Status of Bilateral Aid – Korean ODA by Tying Status
Credits Source: OECD
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-10.png
File image/png, 32k
Title Figure 8.2.: Tying Status of Bilateral Aid – ODA by Tying Status (2000)
Credits Source: OECD
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-11.png
File image/png, 25k
Title Figure 8.3.: Tying Status of Bilateral Aid – ODA by Tying Status (2010)
Credits Source: OECD
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-12.png
File image/png, 30k
Title Figure 9.1: Korean ODA by Region (Constant 2010 USD)
Credits Source: OECD and World Bank Development Indicators
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-13.png
File image/png, 39k
Title Figure 9.2: Korean ODA by Region (2010)
Credits Source: OECD and World Bank Development Indicators
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-14.png
File image/png, 31k
Title Figure 9.3: Top Recipient Countries (sum 2000-2009)
Credits Source: OECD and World Bank Development Indicators
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-15.png
File image/png, 30k
Title Figure 10.1. ­ Korean ODA to Africa and LDC+LIC (Million constant 2010 USD) –
Credits Source: OECD
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-16.png
File image/png, 37k
Title Figure 10.2. ­ Korean ODA to Africa and LDC+LIC (in percentage)
Credits Source: OECD
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-17.png
File image/png, 23k
Title Figure 10.3. ­ DAC ODA to Africa and LDC+LIC (in percentage)
Credits Source: OECD
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-18.png
File image/png, 24k
Title Figure 11 ­ Korean Loan Share to LDC and LIC countries (in percentage)
Credits Source: OECD
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-19.png
File image/png, 25k
Title Figure 12 ­ Korean Aid by Sector (Constant 2010 USD)
Credits Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-20.png
File image/png, 48k
Title Figure 13.1 ­ Korean ODA in Education
Credits Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-21.png
File image/png, 32k
Title Figure 13.2 ­ Korean ODA in Health
Credits Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-22.png
File image/png, 27k
Title Figure 14 – Environmental Share of Assistance
Credits Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-23.png
File image/png, 39k
Title Figure 15.1 ­ ODA to Women’s Equality Organisations and Institutions (in percentage)
Credits Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-24.png
File image/png, 32k
Title Figure 15.2 ­ ODA to Rural Development ­ Women’s Equality (in percentage)
Credits Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-25.png
File image/png, 32k
Title Figure 16 ­ Total Number of Recipient Countries and Sectors Assisted by EU and Korea
Credits Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-26.png
File image/png, 24k
Title Figure 17.1. – Korean Humanitarian Aid (Constant 2010 USD)
Credits Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-27.png
File image/png, 21k
Title Figure 17.2. – Korean Humanitarian Aid (in percentage)
Credits Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-28.png
File image/png, 44k
Title Figure 18.1 ­ Common Countries and Sectors Assisted by Korea and the European Union ­ Number of Receipient Countries and Sectors commonly assisted by EU and Korea
Caption Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System, 2012
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-29.png
File image/png, 17k
Title Figure 18.2 ­ Common Countries and Sectors Assisted by Korea and the European Union ­ Percentage of the Total Number of Receipient Countries and Sectors assisted by EU and Korea that are commonly assisted by both (EU and Korea)
Caption Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System, 2012
URL http://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/1535/img-30.png
File image/png, 16k
Top of page

References

Electronic reference

Axel Marx and Jadir Soares, « South Korea’s Transition from Recipient to DAC Donor: Assessing Korea’s Development Cooperation Policy », International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique de développement [Online], 4.2 |  2013, Online since 10 June 2013, connection on 27 July 2016. URL : http://poldev.revues.org/1535 ; DOI : 10.4000/poldev.1535

Top of page

About the authors

Axel Marx

Axel Marx is research manager and senior researcher at the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, University of Leuven.

Jadir Soares

Jadir Soares is researcher at the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, University of Leuven.

Top of page

Copyright

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License.

Top of page