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Is the Humanitarian Failure in Haiti a System Failure?

A Comment on Jean-Marc Biquet’s critique ‘Haiti: Between Emergency and Reconstruction. An Inadequate Response’
Andrea Binder

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1It has become common sense in humanitarian circles to refer to the emergency responses to the 2010 Haiti earthquake and subsequent cholera outbreak as a failure. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) began doing so publicly in a December 2010 article published in The Guardian.1 In this regard, Jean-Marc Biquet’s article – ‘Haiti: Between Emergency and Reconstruction. An Inadequate Response‘ – reflects a long list of publications that describe and analyse the international system’s shortcomings in responding to Haiti’s twin 2010 disasters.2

2There are, however, two arguments in Biquet’s piece worth examining in more detail. First, he claims that the earthquake and cholera responses were inadequate because the resources mobilized, and the international promises to quickly ‘build back better’, did not match the results expected by the Haitian people. In doing so, Biquet implies that expectation management is an important part of a successful humanitarian response. This point is rarely made in the humanitarian discourse regarding the success or failure of individual operations. This comment will thus consider Biquet’s argument about expectation management in more detail.

  • 3  See MSF (2006) International Activity Report ‘United Nations: Deceptive Humanitarian Reforms?’, ht (...)

3Second, Biquet argues that with respect to effective emergency response, the mainstream international humanitarian system itself is the problem, rather than the solution. MSF has made this assertion about system failure, or the risk thereof, from the inception of the humanitarian reform agenda and the introduction of the cluster system in 2005.3 It is one of the reasons MSF does not officially participate in cluster coordination. For many in MSF, the Haiti case serves to prove their point. This argument – unlike the first regarding expectation management – has been made over and over again. This review thus asks: Does Haiti really prove the system is faulty? What alternative approaches to the cluster system are MSF and other critics promoting?

Successful Humanitarian Operations are a Function of the Capacity to Deliver and the Integrity to Manage Expectations of Aid Recipients

  • 4  Biquet makes this argument implicitly, but I believe the way I present it here reflects one of the (...)

4Let’s begin with the first argument. A successful collective humanitarian operation is an equation with two variables: the capacity of humanitarian actors to deliver and the integrity to manage the expectations of the affected population.4

  • 5  For example Paul Farmer (2006) The Uses of Haiti (Common Courage Press); and Paul Farmer (2011) Ha (...)

5The massive scope of the emergency relief the international community levied in response to the earthquake in Haiti is well known. Yet, despite this enormous mobilization of financial and human resources, the results did not match expectations. Biquet argues this asymmetry between outcome and expectations is due to the fact that many international actors promised the unachievable: to ‘build back better’, as stated by Bill Clinton, and to affect a quick recovery in a chronically poor country with a long, troubled history of successive natural disasters, social unrest, bad governance and unfair trade regulations.5 In his piece, Biquet finds these promises to be disingenuous, or ‘reality denial’ (p.3), given the scale of death and destruction caused by the earthquake. Slogans such as ‘build back better’ and ‘trade, not aid’, while primarily targeted towards public and private donors in rich countries, raised expectations of a better future among Haitians. But the situation of many Haitians affected by the earthquake has not significantly improved since the early stages of the international response. Who is to blame?

6Before Biquet moves on to the standard answer to this question – the Haitian government, major international donors and, to some degree, humanitarian organizations – he makes an interesting point:  ‘[T]here is clearly an imbalance between the means and the energy deployed on the one hand and, on the other, the limited results – or perceived results – of the collective effort made by aid actors. And the gap between what this discourse suggested  [with respect to building back better and quick recovery] and the reality is immense’ (p. 3).

7In other words, the failure of the earthquake response is a matter of its perceived results. That is, as Biquet points out, success and failure do not depend solely on objective measures. They also depend on perceptions. The extravagant promises made to impress donors and motivate the Haitian government belittled the actual results achieved. The fact that 279,000 Haitians remain homeless is as much the result of structural urban poverty in Haiti as it is reflective of the limits of the international emergency response.6 As one Haitian government employee pointed out during the IASC real time evaluation:7

  • 8  Conversation of the author with an employee of the Ministry of Youth and Education, Port-au-Prince (...)

‘The problem of the international humanitarian community is that they have to mount an emergency shelter response without being able to distinguish between those who are homeless anyway and those who are homeless due to the earthquake. My guess would be that at least 30 per cent of the people under tents and tarpaulins in Port-au-Prince belong to the former group.’8

8This example is paradigmatic of the overall situation in Haiti, applying equally – as Jean-Marc Biquet demonstrates – to other basic services such as access to clean water or healthcare. Managing expectations, rather than creating false hope, is therefore an important responsibility of the humanitarian community. Given the Haitian context, Biquet’s tacit argument that the optimistic slogans were disingenuous promises is thus a harsh, though not misplaced, criticism.

  • 9  This was one of the motivations for the production of the evaluation movie directed by Francois Gr (...)

9It sheds light upon a problem rarely discussed in humanitarian circles. The messages and slogans invented in New York, London or Geneva to impress public and private donors affect people on the ground. Their effect on the Haitian people became obvious during the beneficiary consultations and focus group discussions conducted with Haitian humanitarian organizations during the IASC real time evaluation. Haitians complained about the way they were portrayed in Western (media) reports, while also expressing hope in the promise that this would be a turning point for Haiti, and thus their personal history.9

  • 10  Francois Grünewald and Andrea Binder (2012) ‘Inter-agency Real-time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 Months (...)
  • 11  CDAC provides coordinated communication services in crisis situations so that humanitarian actors (...)
  • 12  Yo Pale, Ann Kite (2011) ‘Let Them Speak: Best Practice and Lessons Learned in Communication with (...)

10Communication was an important issue throughout the earthquake response, not least because the international humanitarian community had difficulties managing the international media during the early stages of the disaster (Grünewald, Binder 2010).10 Furthermore, the Communication with Disaster Affected Communities (CDAC) piloted its first field presence in Haiti, using radio shows, travelling events (‘Koute Ayiti’ – Listen to Haiti) and SMS to establish two-way communication between the aid community and Haitians. CDAC Haiti also provided support for the coordination of the international humanitarian community’s communication strategy.11 Nevertheless, the discussions regarding the role of communication in the earthquake response did not recognize that in a virtually connected world, the messages created for domestic audiences in the West are also available to the affected people. Consequently, managing the expectations of affected governments and populations through sensible, realistic messaging should become part of humanitarian organizations' operational duties. If any humanitarian response is to be perceived as successful, learning this lesson from Haiti is key. During the cholera response, which the Western media covered only marginally, the attention paid to communication, including the engagement of CDAC Haiti, paled in comparison to that of the earthquake response.12

Do the Haiti Responses Indicate Systemic Failure?

  • 13 Francois Grünewald and Andrea Binder (2012) ‘Inter-agency Real-time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 Months A (...)

11Like many others, Biquet insists that the mistakes made in response to earthquake in Haiti are symptomatic of system failure. There certainly is much to be criticized regarding the cluster system and humanitarian reform and their implementation in Haiti.13 Upon my departure from Haiti in April 2010, having conducted the IASC real-time evaluation for the international response, I shared this gloom about the international humanitarian system. With some distance, however, and from a scientific perspective, I believe this generalized critique must be rejected for three reasons.

  • 14  Andrea Binder and Francois Grünewald (2009) ‘Cluster Evaluation Phase II Country Study Haiti’ http (...)
  • 15  Maurer, Tim (2013) ‘Governing International Humanitarian Assistance: The Politics of a Business th (...)
  • 16 On institutional change, see, for example North, Douglass C (1993) ‘Towards a Theory of Institution (...)
  • 17  Interview with OCHA, Geneva, July 2013.

12First, a single case is not enough to condemn an entire system. Based on an analysis of six case studies (including Haiti), the IASC Cluster Approach Evaluation II concluded that the benefits of the cluster system ‘slightly outweigh its cost and shortcomings.’14 In light of the difficult history of humanitarian coordination,15 this ‘slightly’ should prevent us from leaping to the conclusion of system failure with respect to Haiti. Reform, particularly reform across large and diverse organizations such as the UN, large international NGOs and the ICRC, takes a lot of time. And by ‘a lot of time’, we are referring to decades, not years.16 If actors have a genuine interest in improving humanitarian assistance, they should thus refrain from calling for the reform of the reform too quickly. Nevertheless, this is exactly what happened. Following the experience of two exceptionally large disasters in 2010 – Haiti and the Pakistan floods – international humanitarian reform was profoundly questioned. At the same time, many smaller, less controversial crises were overlooked as potential evidence for the evaluation as to how well (or poorly) ‘the system’ actually performed. The cases of Haiti and Pakistan were sufficient such that key actors, including the Emergency Response Coordinator Valerie Amos, felt it necessary to invent a new rallying cry: The Transformative Agenda.17 The humanitarian reform process is now politically endangered before its complete establishment and implementation.

13Second, if we want to evaluate whether Haiti has been a system failure, we need to disaggregate ‘Haiti’ into two separate large-scale disasters – the earthquake and the cholera epidemic. Although the geographic location is the same, the two Haitian disasters were distinct. The earthquake was a sudden-onset urban disaster. The vast majority of casualties occurred within the first few hours after the earthquake struck. It caused the visible destruction of life and infrastructure. This conspicuous destruction made the required response fairly obvious to humanitarian specialists and generalists alike. The earthquake was widely mediatized and funded. It concerned all humanitarian sectors, from child protection to food assistance.

  • 18  Telephone Interview with former MSF staff, July 2013.

14The cholera outbreak, in contrast, began as a silent disaster with a mere three cases in rural Artibonite.18 It was essentially neglected by the media and suffered from donor fatigue (although, as Biquet points out, many organizations continued to have more than enough money on hand due to the financial largess they experienced in the aftermath of the earthquake). The outbreak mainly affected the health, water and sanitation sectors of humanitarian response, requiring health specialists to devise an accurate and effective strategy.

15Moreover, in between these two Haitian emergencies, a third sweeping humanitarian crisis erupted with floods in Pakistan. The flood response drew many humanitarian workers from the Caribbean to Central Asia. As a result, the international humanitarian staff that conducted the earthquake response, including cluster coordinators and heads of agencies, had been  nearly completely transferred out of the country when the cholera epidemic broke out.

  • 19  Telephone Interview with former MSF staff, July 2013.
  • 20 Francois Grünewald and Andrea Binder (2010) ‘Inter-agency Real-time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 months A (...)
  • 21 See, for example,  Bhattacharjee, Abhijit and Roberta Lossio. (2011) ‘Evaluation of OCHA Response t (...)
  • 22  http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5945a1.htm?s_cid=mm5945a1_w
  • 23  Telephone interview with former MSF staff, July 2013.

16‘One country. One year. Two different disasters. Two different performances of the cluster system, at least from the point of view of the health sector. During the earthquake response the cluster system was actually helpful. During the cholera response, it failed us.’19 This is the bottom-line for a former senior MSF staffer, one of the few people involved in the response to both Haitian emergencies. For him, the varying performance of ‘the system’ derives from differences in individual leadership – an analysis supported by third-party evaluations of humanitarian coordination during the two disasters.20 Whereas an emergency-oriented individual led the health cluster during the earthquake response, the WHO/PAHO Head of Office at the time of the cholera outbreak was development-oriented. Lacking experience in cholera response (as the disease is not endemic in Latin America), the cluster lead decided to back the demands of the Haitian Ministry of Public Health and Population for the capacity-building required to allow the Haitian government to address cholera itself. After all, at the time, the outbreak was limited to only three cases. Although correct in principle – particularly considering the gross undermining of the Haitian government’s capability and authority during the earthquake response – this decision proved deadly.21 Within weeks, the disease spun out of control, catching a large portion of the humanitarian community unprepared.22 Only the two organisations that stayed outside the cluster strategy – MSF and the Cuban Medical Brigades – were prepared for the wave of cholera infections that befell Haiti in autumn 2010. As Biquet points out, they collectively treated 80 per cent of all cases in 2010/11. ‘Nevertheless, if you want to, you can find something good about the cluster, even in this case. Without it, WHO/PAHO might never have come up to MSF and tell us about these three cases in Artibonite. This information was crucial for our timely response.’23

17A third reason the Haiti responses do not demonstrate systemic failure is logical fallacy in attributing the behaviour of cluster members to the approach itself. Biquet argues that there were too many actors without sufficient experience or expertise present in Haiti. This claim is backed by evidence.24 He blames this problem upon the cluster system’s purported tendency ‘to legitimise all actors that aim to take part, regardless of their real capacity or impact’ (p.5). International humanitarian response, however, faced a nearly identical situation in Sri Lanka after the tsunami, before the cluster system was even born. The cluster approach, moreover, was never intended to function as a selection mechanism, but rather to coordinate actors on the ground. Interestingly, the system was flexible enough to develop an informal selection mechanism during the Haiti earthquake response. The WHO, together with five relevant health organizations (including MSF), formed a ‘baby-cluster’ to discuss strategic questions, while general cluster meetings were used to share information and so on.25 Nevertheless, this approach does not make the necessary step of tackling the lack of a selection mechanism at the systemic level. Attempts to do so through certification schemes and legal regulations have gained momentum in recent years, but they remain at the margins of humanitarian discourse.26

An Inadequate Style of Criticism

18In this reaction to Jean-Marc Biquet’s critique of the international response in Haiti, I gave the cluster system greater benefit of the doubt than I have in the past. This is not to ‘shy away’ (p.6) from making mistakes transparent and calling for accountability. Our IASC real-time evaluation was outspoken about leadership failures, sidelining local initiatives and other shortcomings. However, the style of criticism levied by MSF against the cluster approach makes it necessary to call for a more nuanced analysis.

19The raison d’être of MSF, of course, is to speak out. Increasingly, its ‘témoignage’ seems to highlight not only the situation of affected people but also the failures of the humanitarian system. It includes an admirable transparency about the organization’s own difficulties.27 This transparency, in combination with the organization’s high-quality work in Haiti, makes it particularly well placed to offer criticism.28

20Biquet perceives this criticism as a duty, arguing, ‘it would be irresponsible to hide behind […] Haiti’s exceptional situation […] of suffering two large-scale disasters in quick succession [...] and shy away from questioning the coordination system and the real capacity for aid that it offers […].’ But humanitarian practitioners and academics have not refrained from self-criticism in the case of Haiti. What is lacking is not criticism, but productive ideas as to how to make the system work, improve coordination and leadership, respect local initiatives, and limit the number of actors in large-scale, easily accessible disasters.

21It is time for MSF to grow out of the role of the nagger and start shaping the discourse about the future of collective humanitarianism constructively.

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Notes

1  Unni Karunakara (2010) ‘Haiti: Where aid failed’ http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/dec/28/haiti-cholera-earthquake-aid-agencies-failure   
(accessed 22/07/2013).

2  See, for example Katz, Jonathan M (2013) The Big Truck That Went By: How the World Came to Save Haiti and Left Behind a Disaster (New York: Palgrave McMillan); Ramachandran Vijaya and Julie Walz (2012) ‘Haiti: Where Has All the Money Gone?’ (London: Center for Global Development) http://international.cgdev.org/blog/haiti-where-has-all-money-gone (accessed 26/07/2013); Ramachandran, Vijaya (2013) ‘Haiti’s Earthquake Generated a $9bn Response – Where Did the Money Go?’ http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/jan/14/haiti-earthquake-where-did-money-go (accessed 26/06/2013).

3  See MSF (2006) International Activity Report ‘United Nations: Deceptive Humanitarian Reforms?’, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/ar/report.cfm?id=3230, accessed 26/07/2013; Derderian, Katharine et al. (2007) ‘UN Humanitarian Reforms: A View from the Field’ Humanitarian Exchange Magazine (39)2007 http://www.odihpn.org/humanitrian-exchange-magazine/issue-39/un-humanitarian-reforms-a-view-from-the-field (accessed 26/06/2013).

4  Biquet makes this argument implicitly, but I believe the way I present it here reflects one of the author’s key points, made in the  section ‘Unkept Promises and Mixing Roles’.

5  For example Paul Farmer (2006) The Uses of Haiti (Common Courage Press); and Paul Farmer (2011) Haiti After the Earthquake (New York: Public Affairs).

6 http://emergingfrontiersblog.com/2013/07/19/haiti-sees-big-drop-in-quake-homeless/ (accessed 26/07/2013).

7  Francois Grünewald and Andrea Binder (2012) ‘Inter-agency Real-time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 Months After the Earthquake’ (Plaisians: Berlin) http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/media/pub/2010/binder_2010_haiti-RTE.pdf, (accessed 22/07/2013).

8  Conversation of the author with an employee of the Ministry of Youth and Education, Port-au-Prince, April 2010.

9  This was one of the motivations for the production of the evaluation movie directed by Francois Grünewald to complement the IASC real-time evaluation of the earthquake response. The movie is available online at http://vimeo.com/15198053, last accessed 22/07/2013.

10  Francois Grünewald and Andrea Binder (2012) ‘Inter-agency Real-time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 Months After the Earthquake’ (Plaisians: Berlin) http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/media/pub/2010/binder_2010_haiti-RTE.pdf  (accessed 22/07/2013).

11  CDAC provides coordinated communication services in crisis situations so that humanitarian actors can inform the affected population and enable the population to report back to them. http://www.cdacnetwork.org/public/content/cdac-haiti-and-koute-ayiti-caravan, (accessed 26/07/2013); Cecilia M. Ljungman (2012) CDAC Haiti Learning Reviewhttp://www.cdacnetwork.org/sites/www.cdacnetwork.org/files/cdac0612_haiti_lr_005_full_0.pdf, (accessed 26/07/2013).

12  Yo Pale, Ann Kite (2011) ‘Let Them Speak: Best Practice and Lessons Learned in Communication with Disaster Affected Communities’ InfoAsAidhttp://infoasaid.org/research/ann-kite-yo-pale-best-practice-and-lessons-learned-communication-disaster-affected-communit (accessed 26/07/2013); Wall, Imogen (2011) ‘Delivering Communications in an Emergency Response: Observations from Haiti’ Humanitarian Exchange Magazine (52)-2011. http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-52/delivering-communications-in-an-emergency-response-observations-from-haiti (accessed 26/07/2013).

13 Francois Grünewald and Andrea Binder (2012) ‘Inter-agency Real-time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 Months After the Earthquake’ (Plaisians: Berlin) http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/media/pub/2010/binder_2010_haiti-RTE.pdf  (accessed 22/07/2013).;  IASC (2010) ‘Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti: Following the 12 January 2010 Earthquake’ http://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/response-humanitarian-crisis-haiti-following-12-january-2010-earthquake-achievements, (accessed 26/06/2013); Bhattacharjee, Abhijit and Roberta Lossio (2011) ‘Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake.’ https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/Evaluation%20of%20OCHA%20Response%20to%20the%20Haiti%20Earthquake.pdf (accessed 26/07/2013); overview at http://www.alnap.org/current/haitiportalresources.aspx

14  Andrea Binder and Francois Grünewald (2009) ‘Cluster Evaluation Phase II Country Study Haiti’ http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/GPPi-URD_Cluster_II_Evaluation_HAITI_e.pdf (accessed 26/07/2013); Julia Steets, Francois Grünewald, Andrea Binder et.al. (2010) ‘Cluster Evaluation Phase II Synthesis Report’ p. 11. http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/GPPi-URD_Cluster_II_Evaluation_SYNTHESIS_REPORT_e.pdf, (accessed 26/07/2013).

15  Maurer, Tim (2013) ‘Governing International Humanitarian Assistance: The Politics of a Business that is about Saving Lives’ (forthcoming); Barnett, Michael and Thomas G. Weiss (2008) ‘Humanitarianism: A Brief History of the Present’ In: Michael Barnett/Thomas G. Weiss (eds.). Humanitarianism in Question – Politics, Power, and Ethics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press); Donini, Antonio (1996) The Policies of Mercy: UN coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Rwanda. Occasional Paper series #22 (Providence: Brown University, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies).

16 On institutional change, see, for example North, Douglass C (1993) ‘Towards a Theory of Institutional Change’ In: Political Economy: Institutions, Competition and Representation: Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics. William A. Barnett, Melvin J. Hinich, Normal J. Schofield (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 61-69; Pierson, Paul (2000) ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.’The American Political Science Review 94(2): 251-67.

17  Interview with OCHA, Geneva, July 2013.

18  Telephone Interview with former MSF staff, July 2013.

19  Telephone Interview with former MSF staff, July 2013.

20 Francois Grünewald and Andrea Binder (2010) ‘Inter-agency Real-time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 months After the Earthquake’ (Plaisians: Berlin) http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/media/pub/2010/binder_2010_haiti-RTE.pdf, (accessed 22/07/2013); Patrick, Jonathan (2011) ‘Evaluation Insights. Haiti Earthquake Response: Emerging Lessons Learned’, http://www.oecd.org/countries/haiti/50313700.pdf, (accessed 26/07/2013); Bhattacharjee, Abhijit and Roberta Lossio. (2011) ‘Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake’ https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/Evaluation%20of%20OCHA%20Response%20to%20the%20Haiti%20Earthquake.pdf, (accessed 26/07/2013).

21 See, for example,  Bhattacharjee, Abhijit and Roberta Lossio. (2011) ‘Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake’ https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/Evaluation%20of%20OCHA%20Response%20to%20the%20Haiti%20Earthquake.pdf, (accessed 26/07/2013).; Doucet, Isabeau (2011) ‘The Nation: NGOs Have Failed Haiti’ http://www.npr.org/2011/01/13/132884795/the-nation-how-ngos-have-failed-haiti, (accessed 26/07/2013); IASC (2011) ‘Inter-Agency Real-Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Earthquake in Haiti: 20 months after’ http://www.unicef.org/evaluation/files/IA_RTE_Haiti_phase_2_final_report(1).pdf, (accessed 26/07/2013).

22  http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5945a1.htm?s_cid=mm5945a1_w

23  Telephone interview with former MSF staff, July 2013.

24  For example, Paul Farmer (2012) and Francois Grünewald and Andrea Binder (2010).

25 Francois Grünewald and Andrea Binder (2012) ‘Inter-agency Real-time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 Months After the Earthquake.’ (Plaisians: Berlin) http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/media/pub/2010/binder_2010_haiti-RTE.pdf  (accessed 22/07/2013).

26 http://www.schr.info/certification-project/ (accessed 26/07/2013); http://ifrc.org/PageFiles/41194/113600-idrl-deskstudy-en.pdf, p. 90ff.

27 see MSF (2011) Humanitarian Negotiations Revealed: The MSF Experience http://www.msf-crash.org/livres/en/humanitarian-negotiations-revealed  (accessed 02/11/2013).

28 MSF (2011) OCG response to cholera in Haiti http://evaluation.msf.at/fileadmin/evaluation/files/documents/reports/Eval_Report_Cholera_Haiti_external_Dec_2011.pdf  (accessed 02/11/2013).

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References

Electronic reference

Andrea Binder, « Is the Humanitarian Failure in Haiti a System Failure? », International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique de développement [Online], 4.3 | 2013, Online since 05 November 2013, connection on 21 September 2017. URL : http://poldev.revues.org/1625 ; DOI : 10.4000/poldev.1625

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About the author

Andrea Binder

Andrea Binder is associate director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin. Her areas of expertise include humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and monitoring and evaluation. Ms. Binder has been closely involved in the Inter-Agency Real-Time Evaluation of the disaster response to the Haiti Earthquake.

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Copyright

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License.

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