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2013

Asian and African Development Trajectories Revisiting Facts and Figures

Gilles Carbonnier, Pavel Chakraborty, Emmanuel Dalle Mulle y Cartografare il presente

Resumen

In today’s dominant discourse, the development trajectory of many East Asian countries is pictured as a success, whereas that of many sub-Saharan African countries is considered a failure. The Asian success stories often refer to the developmental state model, which highlights the pivotal role played by Asian political elites in catalyzing economic growth and broad-based development. The model includes economic liberalization and outward-oriented policies, with targeted support to – and protection of – strategic sectors and infant industries.
How far is this underlying assumption supported by empirical evidence? This working paper examines a wide range of economic, social, institutional and governance indicators for a sample of six sub-Saharan and five South East Asian countries. Contrary to our research hypothesis, we did not find any significant difference in the level of government involvement in the domestic economy between the countries of the two regions, nor in the quality of institutions and governance indicators, nor in the share of imports and exports in GDP.
Even if there are important gaps between the two regions, for instance with regard to the demographic transition, the agricultural sector or tertiary education, the picture is much more nuanced than portrayed by the dominant discourse. Our review of economic and socio-political indicators tells a rather different story, but not the whole story. Nevertheless, the indicators fail to take into account all the historical, institutional and structural factors that matter a great deal for development. Hence our analysis should be complemented by detailed country case studies to uncover the specific dynamics underlying different development trajectories and outcomes.

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Notas de la redacción

Prepared in the framework of the Traverse Conference organized by SDC in Bern on 16 June 2010.

Texto completo

Introduction

1This paper originates from a panel discussion organized by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) on 16 June 2010 in Bern. Fifty years after independence in sub-Saharan Africa, three panellists confronted their views on the development trajectories of selected Asian and African countries. The objective of this paper was to set the stage for a discussion on a range of economic, social and politico-institutional indicators. The starting point was to question the widespread belief in the relative success of South East Asian countries and the relative failure of their sub-Saharan African counterparts. As the organizers put it: “where does this popular feeling come from, that Asian countries today, save a few dramatic cases, are in a vibrant economic shape, so as to challenge the Western hegemony, whereas this picture is perceived the other way round for Africa?

2In a seminal paper published in 1993 entitled The East Asian Miracle, the World Bank argued that the success of the newly industrialized countries in Asia resulted from their progressive integration into the world market, through a gradual opening of the economy and the promotion of exports. Subsequently, Joseph Stiglitz (1996), along with other economists, stressed the role played by Asian governments in steering economic growth and catalysing the development process. These authors then attributed the Asian miracle to the so-called “developmental state model” that refers to “the seamless web of political, bureaucratic and moneyed influences that structures economic life in capitalist Northeast Asia” (Woo-Cumings, 1999). Common wisdom today holds that the development of East Asian countries stemmed from a unique mix of market liberalization and strategic government intervention.

  • 1 Although Bangladesh in fact belongs to South Asia, as a matter of simplicity, we will refer to Sout (...)

3To what extent have South East Asian countries followed a similar development path over the last two or three decades? Does empirical data confirm such a claim? Are there remarkable differences between South East Asian and sub-Saharan African countries with respect to economic, social and governance indicators? At the Traverse meeting organized by SDC on 16 June 2010 in Bern, we presented and discussed selected data to question some of the widespread beliefs concerning recent African and Asian development trajectories. We examined demographic, social, economic and governance indicators for a sample of six sub-Saharan African and five South East Asian countries: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria and Tanzania; Bangladesh1, Laos, Malaysia, The Philippines and Vietnam. This selection was agreed on with SDC on the basis that, for both regions, there is one upper-middle country with abundant extractive resources (Botswana and Malaysia), a few lower-middle income countries (Nigeria, the Philippines and Vietnam), and six others ranking among low-income countries, two of which are landlocked (Burkina Faso, Laos). The objective was not to systematically compare data between these two country groupings, but rather to present facts and figures that bring into question certain prejudices and highlight trends.

4In this paper, we first provide a picture of the main socio-demographic and economic indicators, including with regard to the agricultural sector. We then shift the focus on the role of the state, assessing the quality of financial and institutional management as well as the degree of state involvement in the economy. We further look at the degree of integration into the world economy and inflows from abroad (official development assistance, migrant remittances and foreign direct investment). In the last section, we sum up the major findings and draw a number of conclusions.

I. Demographic, Economic and Social Indicators

5Figure 1 shows the evolution of population trends worldwide since 1950, with projections for 2050. East Asia has traditionally been a densely populated region with abundant labour. Sub-Saharan Africa, in contrast, is rather labour scarce and land abundant. This may change over the coming 40 years. Between 2000 and 2050, sub-Saharan Africa’s population is expected to rise by an impressive 160 percent. Some countries will then turn into relatively labour-abundant economies, with a dramatic impact in terms of development dynamics and changes in potential comparative advantages.

Figure 1: Population Trend

Figure 1: Population Trend

Million people. Size of the squares proportional to the total population.

World Population Prospects, the 2008 Revision, UN-DESA

6In parallel, arable land per capita is generally higher in Africa than it is in Asia (Figure 2). It is no wonder that many Asian countries specialize in labour-intensive industrial activities, such as textile and clothing production, while African countries have focused on extensive agriculture. The value added per agricultural worker tends to be lower in Africa, albeit with some exceptions. In our sample, Botswana has for instance an average value added per agricultural worker that is higher than Vietnam.

Figure 2: Arable Land per Capita and Agriculture Value Added per Worker

Figure 2: Arable Land per Capita and Agriculture Value Added per Worker

World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank, 2010

7As is well documented, the green revolution increased yield in many Asian countries over the past four decades. Looking at agricultural productivity, it is interesting to compare the rate of foreign and domestic investments in this sector since the 1970s. Unfortunately, data is not readily available. However, we can look at cereal yield and the consumption of fertilizers per hectare in the two regions. As shown in Figures 3 and 4, we find clear differences between the two regions, confirming that South East Asia is well ahead of sub-Saharan Africa in its transition from extensive to intensive agriculture.

Figure 3: Cereal Yield

Figure 3: Cereal Yield

World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank 2010

Figure 4: Fertilizer Consumption

Figure 4: Fertilizer Consumption

World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank 2010

8There are also substantial differences in the population natural increase rate and in the recent evolution of life expectancy between the two regions (Figure 5 and 6). While all five Asian countries are in the midst of a steep demographic transition characterized by lower birth rates, this is not the case for the sub-Saharan countries in our sample, with the exception of Botswana and – more recently – Ghana. South East Asian countries have registered a remarkable improvement in life expectancy, which is much less the case in sub-Saharan Africa – and even sharply negative in Botswana since 1985 – notably because of the HIV/AIDS epidemics.

Figure 5: Annual Population Natural Increase Rate

Figure 5: Annual Population Natural Increase Rate

World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank 2010

Figure 6: Evolution of Life Expectancy at Birth

Figure 6: Evolution of Life Expectancy at Birth

World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank 2010

  • 2 Hereinafter, and unless otherwise indicated, Asian and African countries refer to the eleven countr (...)
  • 3 Looking from the inner circle showing the size of GDP in 1990 to the outer circle showing GDP size (...)

9Over the last two decades, Asian economies grew more, on average, than their African counterparts2. Figure 7 shows unabated GDP growth in South East Asia from 1990 to 2008, except for Laos which did not experience much growth in the 1990s3. All the sub-Saharan countries in our sample grew little in the 1990s (the so-called ‘missed decade’ of African development), but they have since caught up from 2000 onwards, most notably in Nigeria due to booming oil prices.

Figure 7: Population Living Below 1 US Dollar a Day

Figure 7: Population Living Below 1 US Dollar a Day

Millennium Development Goals Indicators, United Nations Statistic Division, 2010

10Adult illiteracy is generally higher in African countries than it is in Asian countries, with the notable exception of Bangladesh that has the third highest illiteracy rate in our sample (45 percent of the population), behind Burkina Faso and Mozambique. Figure 8 shows that primary school enrollment is quite high for all countries, except Burkina Faso and – more strikingly perhaps – that university enrollment is extremely low in all six sub-Saharan African countries.

Figure 8: School Enrollment

Figure 8: School Enrollment

World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank 2010

11Africa tends to have lower access to drinking water and electricity, with 63 percent of the population having access to clean water in contrast to 84 percent for the Asian countries in our sample, and 477 KwH of per capita electricity consumption against 1,281 KwH in South East Asia. Once again, Botswana – the only upper-middle income economy in our sub-Saharan African country sample – stands out as an exception with a per capita consumption of electricity of 1,435 KwH and an access rate to water as high as 96 percent.

12Income inequality tends to be higher in some sub-Saharan African countries than in South East Asia. Figure 9 illustrates the concentration of national income in the richest and poorest strata of the population in each country. The high level of income concentration in many sub-Saharan countries may appear as counter-intuitive according to Mkandawire (2002): being relatively poor and with a large share of the population concentrated in agriculture, Africa should be characterized by a relatively lower degree of social inequality than richer, more industrialized countries. Again, the case of Botswana stands out. Despite being renowned for its economic success, having escaped the so-called “resource curse”, and recording one of the highest growth rates worldwide between 1960 and 1990 by virtue of its diamond mining industry, the country suffers from a highly skewed pattern of income distribution.

Figure 9: Income/Expenditure Share of the Richest and Poorest 10% of the Population

Figure 9: Income/Expenditure Share of the Richest and Poorest 10% of the Population

World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank, 2010

II Role of the State and Governance

13If we compare GDP per capita ranking with HDI ranking, we find in Figure 10 that Nigeria has for instance a considerably higher GDP per capita than Vietnam and Laos. Yet the latter fares better in terms of HDI. Since the HDI also reflects health and education indicators in addition to income per capita, we should expect to see much lower public expenditure in health and education in Nigeria than in Vietnam and Laos.

Figure 10: GDP per Capita

Figure 10: GDP per Capita

Human Development Report, 2009, UNDP

14Figure 11 shows that African countries actually tend to allocate a greater share of public expenditure to the health sector while the situation is more complex with regard to education. Malaysia is clearly ahead of the pack with a quarter of public spending set aside for education, but Botswana and Tanzania do not lag too far behind with around 20 percent of public expenditure on education. Likewise, we cannot draw any clear conclusions as far as military spending is concerned. All the countries in the sample remain below 2.5 percent of GDP except for Botswana (3.4 percent).

Figure 11: Public Health Expenditure

Figure 11: Public Health Expenditure

World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank, 2010

  • 4 The share of public spending in GDP tends to be much higher in industrialized countries (e.g. 33 pe (...)

15With regard to the overall share of public spending in GDP, there are no major differences between sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia (Figure 12). In both regions, public spending accounts for less than 30 percent of the GDP and the average share is 18 percent for Asian countries and 19.5 percent for African countries4.

Figure 12: Share of Public Expenditure

Figure 12: Share of Public Expenditure

World Bank Development Indicators and Country Assessment Report, World Bank 2010; Olorunfemi Sola, « Public Investment and Growth in Nigeria : an Autoregressive Model », Journal of International Finance and Economics, 8(2), 2008; Edward Mountfield, Public Expenditure Management Strengthening in Vietnam, Presentation for the Japanese Ministry of Finance, Tokyo, March 2006, World Bank

16Tax revenue, as a proportion of GDP, is generally higher in sub-Saharan Africa, albeit with considerable variation as the Botswana tax revenue is as high as 35 percent of GDP (similar to Switzerland or the USA), whereas this figure is only 6 percent in Nigeria and 8 percent in Bangladesh. This can be explained to some extent by the prevalence of the informal sector in the economy.

17Transparency International defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power to government officials for private gain. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is based on opinion polls that provide a subjective measure of perceived corruption (the higher the score, the lower corruption). There is no clear trend emerging from the CPI. Botswana and Malaysia fare best with index values of 5.4 and 5.1, whereas the Democratic Republic of Lao, Bangladesh and Nigeria lie at the other end of the spectrum with rankings of 1.9, 2.0 and 2.2 respectively (Figure 13).

Figure 13: Corruption Perception Index

Figure 13: Corruption Perception Index

Corruption Perception Index, Transparcency International, 2007

18As shown in figure 14, African countries score better with regard to the Press Freedom Index, an annual ranking published by Reporters Without Borders and based on assessments provided by partner organizations and correspondents around the world. The average value is much higher for Asian countries (58.63 against 24.14), meaning that the media in these countries is more susceptible to both direct and indirect forms of pressure (the higher the value of the index, the lower press freedom).

19Figure 14 also provides an illustration of political instability through an index developed by the World Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2009) that varies between -2.5 to +2.5, with the latter figure representing greater stability and less violence. There is no clear distinction between sub-Saharan African and South East Asian countries. Most of them are perceived as being relatively unstable and violent, The Philippines and Nigeria receiving the poorest scores (-1.3 and -0.98 respectively).

Figure 14: Political Stability, Violence and Press Freedom Index

Figure 14: Political Stability, Violence and Press Freedom Index

Daniel Kaufmann et al., World Governance Indicators, Word Bank, 2009; Reporters Without Borders, 2009

  • 5 The relevant indicators range from 0 to 6, where 6 is the best possible outcome. Data on the Philip (...)

20We further look at three additional governance indicators on budgetary and financial management, public administration, and the rule of law and property rights5. Figure 15 refers to the quality of budgetary and financial management, which takes into account the extent to which there is a credible budget, a rigorous management system and accurate and timely reporting. It also refers to public administration, which gauges civil servants’ efficiency in implementing governmental policies (excluding state-owned enterprises, armed forces and sub-national governments). The indicators do not show any remarkable differences between the Asian and African countries in our sample.

Figure 15: Quality of Public Administration and Budgetary and Financial Management Rating

Figure 15: Quality of Public Administration and Budgetary and Financial Management Rating

World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank, 2010

21The same applies to the rule of law and property rights. The rule of law refers to “the extent to which agents have confidence and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime or violence” (Kaufman et al., 2008). Figure 16 shows that, aside from the upper-middle income countries in our sample, i.e. Botswana and Malaysia, all other countries recorded poor results.

Figure 16: Property Rights and Rule-Based Governance Rating

Figure 16: Property Rights and Rule-Based Governance Rating

World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank 2010; Daniel Kaufmann et al., World Governance Indicators, World Bank, 2009

III Globalization, Trade, ODA, Remittances and FDI

22We turn now to the level of globalization and integration of the sample countries into the world economy as measured by their respective total imports and exports of goods, and services as a share of GDP. Our data challenges the widespread assumption that South East Asian economies tend to be systematically more integrated in the world economy and more outward-oriented. As shown in Figure 17, while there are differences among individual countries with regard to their import+export/GDP ratio, there is no clear difference between the two regions as a whole.

Figure 17: Trade/GDP

Figure 17: Trade/GDP

World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank, 2010

23When looking at the overall reliance on official development assistance (ODA), migrant remittances and foreign direct investment (FDI), there are clear differences between sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia. African countries tend to receive relatively more ODA and less FDI and remittances than their South East Asian counterparts, but again with some notable exceptions.

  • 6 Net ODA as a percentage of GDP is not provided for Malaysia and Bangladesh.

24Figure 18 compares ODA and FDI as a share of GDP for the countries selected in the two regions6. Whereas Bangladesh and The Philippines record lower FDI/GDP rates than most African economies, countries like Tanzania or Mozambique have much higher ODA/GDP rates.

Figure 18: Official Development Aid and Foreign Direct Investment

Figure 18: Official Development Aid and Foreign Direct Investment

World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank, 2010

25Remittances, instead, are more important in South East Asia. In the Philippines, for instance, per capita remittances are about 20 times larger than ODA per capita. ODA per capita tends to be much higher than FDI per capita in Africa with the notable exceptions of Botswana and Nigeria (Figure 19).

Figure 19: Remittances and Official Development Aid

Figure 19: Remittances and Official Development Aid
Human Development Report 2009

Conclusion

26This study does not pretend to systematically compare the development trajectories of African countries with those of Asian countries. Its purpose is rather to present and analyze a range of indicators and data with a view to questioning the widely-held view that East Asian countries are examples of development success contrary to sub-Saharan African countries. The second aim is to analyse to what extent the differences in outcome may be explained by the “developmental state” model and outward-oriented policies. We examined some of the empirical underpinnings of explanations on development in East Asia that stress the importance of the role of the government in the economy and the quality of governance. Our main findings question such explanations because there is no marked difference in public spending among the countries in our sample.

27On the basis of the data and indicators for a sample of eleven sub-Saharan African and South East Asian countries, we did not find any significant difference in the share of the state within the economy (government expenditure/GDP ratio) nor in the quality of governance. There is no stark contrast when looking at indicators dealing with the quality of state institutions or with the rule of law. In addition, data on the share of public expenditure concentrated in the health and education sectors fails to account for the gaps between income per capita and HDI performance, with Nigeria for instance ranking lower than both Vietnam and Laos on the HDI scale, despite enjoying higher income per capita than these two countries.

28Our data does not support the traditional understanding that South East Asian economies are systematically more outward-oriented and integrated in the world economy than sub-Saharan countries. An analysis of the aggregate value of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP leads us to conclude that there is no systematic gap between the two regions. There is a clearer difference when looking at official development aid, which is generally larger in sub-Saharan Africa, compared with Asian countries which rely more on remittances and foreign direct investment.

29However, there is a difference between the two regions in their transition from extensive to intensive agriculture. As shown by data on cereal yield and fertilizer consumption per hectare, South East Asian countries have made greater progress than sub-Saharan countries in modernizing their agricultural sector, thereby substantially increasing productivity per hectare. This results not only from differences in irrigation and rainfall patterns, but from diverging production factor endowments and the ensuing comparative advantages. Asia is, and will remain, densely populated, with abundant labour and relatively scarce land. Nevertheless, South East Asian countries are undergoing a rapid demographic transition, which is not yet the case with many African countries. The population of sub-Saharan Africa is expected to grow by more than 160 percent between 2000 and 2050. Its comparative advantage may evolve over the next 40 years from scarce labour and abundant land toward more labour-intensive activities in the manufacturing sector. Industrialization policies followed by Asian countries can provide useful lessons. African countries must be granted the policy space to adopt industrialization policies that are adapted to the reality of the 21st century globalized economy (see Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare, 2010), including effective measures to temporarily protect its infant industry.

30The sub-Saharan African countries in our sample tend to display a slightly lower corruption index and enjoy more press freedom. Yet social inequality is generally more marked in sub-Saharan Africa, and in particular in Botswana, the income of which is concentrated in the diamond sector. Asian countries fare better with regard to tertiary school enrolment. Botswana is again a case in point since, despite being an upper-middle income country, it has lower rates of university enrolment than Bangladesh, a least-developed country.

31In this working paper, we acknowledge the limits of such a quantitative analysis that solely relies on socio-economic and governance indicators. The data cannot account for the diversity of development outcomes or for the major differences in development trajectories between South East Asian and sub-Saharan African countries. Development is a far too complex process to be fully captured by quantitative indicators. History, geography, institutions, policies and circumstances all matter a great deal. This review provides interesting insights that contradict in some respects widely-held beliefs. It must be complemented by detailed country case studies to capture the complex dynamics and contextual factors that explain different development outcomes.

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Bibliografía

Gelb, Alen. (2001). South Africa’s role and importance in Africa and for the development of the African Agenda. Johannesburg: The Edge Institute

Harrison, Ann and Andres Rodriguez-Clare. (2010). “From Hard to Soft Industrial Policies in Developing Countries,” Vox, 27 June 2010. Consulted on 16 November 2010 at http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/5236

Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi. (2008). Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2007. Washington DC: World Bank

Mkandawire, Thandika. (2002). “The Terrible Toll of Post-Colonial Rebel Movements in Africa: Towards an Explanation of the Violence against the Peasantry”. Journal of Modern African Studies. 40 (2). pp. 181-215

Mountfield Edward. (2006). Public Expenditure Management Strengthening in Vietnam, presentation for the Japanese Ministry of Finance. Tokyo. The World Bank

Reporter Without Borders. (2009). Press Freedom Index 2009.

http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2009,1001.html

Sola Olorunfemi. (2008). Public Investment and Growth in Nigeria: an Autoregressive Model. Journal of International Finance and Economics. 8 (2)

Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1996). “Some Lessons from the East Asian Miracle”. The World Bank Research Observer. 11 (2). pp. 151-77

Transparency International. (2007). Corruption Perception Index 2007. http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007

UN DESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs). (2009). World Population Prospects. The 2008 Revision, New York

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). (2009). Overcoming Barriers, Human Mobility  and Development, Human Development Report. New York

United Nations. (2010), The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010, New York

World Bank. (1993). The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. Washington DC: The World Bank

World Bank. (2010). World Bank Development Indicators Database 2010. World Bank, Washington DC

Woo-Cumings, Meredith (ed). (1999). The Developmental State. Ithaca: Cornell University Press

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Notas

1 Although Bangladesh in fact belongs to South Asia, as a matter of simplicity, we will refer to South-East Asia throughout the text.

2 Hereinafter, and unless otherwise indicated, Asian and African countries refer to the eleven countries selected in our sample.

3 Looking from the inner circle showing the size of GDP in 1990 to the outer circle showing GDP size in 2008.

4 The share of public spending in GDP tends to be much higher in industrialized countries (e.g. 33 percent for Switzerland and 53 percent for France).

5 The relevant indicators range from 0 to 6, where 6 is the best possible outcome. Data on the Philippines, Malaysia and Botswana are not available.

6 Net ODA as a percentage of GDP is not provided for Malaysia and Bangladesh.

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Índice de ilustraciones

Título Figure 1: Population Trend
Leyenda Million people. Size of the squares proportional to the total population.
Créditos World Population Prospects, the 2008 Revision, UN-DESA
URL http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/docannexe/image/682/img-1.png
Ficheros image/png, 99k
Título Figure 2: Arable Land per Capita and Agriculture Value Added per Worker
Créditos World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank, 2010
URL http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/docannexe/image/682/img-2.png
Ficheros image/png, 74k
Título Figure 3: Cereal Yield
Créditos World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank 2010
URL http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/docannexe/image/682/img-3.png
Ficheros image/png, 41k
Título Figure 4: Fertilizer Consumption
Créditos World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank 2010
URL http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/docannexe/image/682/img-4.png
Ficheros image/png, 26k
Título Figure 5: Annual Population Natural Increase Rate
Créditos World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank 2010
URL http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/docannexe/image/682/img-5.png
Ficheros image/png, 41k
Título Figure 6: Evolution of Life Expectancy at Birth
Créditos World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank 2010
URL http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/docannexe/image/682/img-6.png
Ficheros image/png, 55k
Título Figure 7: Population Living Below 1 US Dollar a Day
Leyenda Millennium Development Goals Indicators, United Nations Statistic Division, 2010
URL http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/docannexe/image/682/img-7.png
Ficheros image/png, 76k
Título Figure 8: School Enrollment
Créditos World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank 2010
URL http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/docannexe/image/682/img-8.png
Ficheros image/png, 19k
Título Figure 9: Income/Expenditure Share of the Richest and Poorest 10% of the Population
Créditos World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank, 2010
URL http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/docannexe/image/682/img-9.png
Ficheros image/png, 45k
Título Figure 10: GDP per Capita
Créditos Human Development Report, 2009, UNDP
URL http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/docannexe/image/682/img-10.png
Ficheros image/png, 36k
Título Figure 11: Public Health Expenditure
Créditos World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank, 2010
URL http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/docannexe/image/682/img-11.png
Ficheros image/png, 47k
Título Figure 12: Share of Public Expenditure
Créditos World Bank Development Indicators and Country Assessment Report, World Bank 2010; Olorunfemi Sola, « Public Investment and Growth in Nigeria : an Autoregressive Model », Journal of International Finance and Economics, 8(2), 2008; Edward Mountfield, Public Expenditure Management Strengthening in Vietnam, Presentation for the Japanese Ministry of Finance, Tokyo, March 2006, World Bank
URL http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/docannexe/image/682/img-12.png
Ficheros image/png, 106k
Título Figure 13: Corruption Perception Index
Créditos Corruption Perception Index, Transparcency International, 2007
URL http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/docannexe/image/682/img-13.jpg
Ficheros image/jpeg, 264k
Título Figure 14: Political Stability, Violence and Press Freedom Index
Créditos Daniel Kaufmann et al., World Governance Indicators, Word Bank, 2009; Reporters Without Borders, 2009
URL http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/docannexe/image/682/img-14.png
Ficheros image/png, 33k
Título Figure 15: Quality of Public Administration and Budgetary and Financial Management Rating
Créditos World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank, 2010
URL http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/docannexe/image/682/img-15.png
Ficheros image/png, 51k
Título Figure 16: Property Rights and Rule-Based Governance Rating
Créditos World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank 2010; Daniel Kaufmann et al., World Governance Indicators, World Bank, 2009
URL http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/docannexe/image/682/img-16.png
Ficheros image/png, 70k
Título Figure 17: Trade/GDP
Créditos World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank, 2010
URL http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/docannexe/image/682/img-17.png
Ficheros image/png, 33k
Título Figure 18: Official Development Aid and Foreign Direct Investment
Créditos World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank, 2010
URL http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/docannexe/image/682/img-18.png
Ficheros image/png, 72k
Título Figure 19: Remittances and Official Development Aid
URL http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/docannexe/image/682/img-19.png
Ficheros image/png, 41k
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Referencia electrónica

Gilles Carbonnier, Pavel Chakraborty, Emmanuel Dalle Mulle y Cartografare il presente, «Asian and African Development Trajectories Revisiting Facts and Figures»International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique de développement [En línea], Policy Briefs | Working Papers, Publicado el 28 mayo 2013, consultado el 28 marzo 2024. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/682; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/poldev.682

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Autores

Gilles Carbonnier

Professor of Development Economics and Editor-in-Chief of the International Development Policy, The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies – Geneva

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Pavel Chakraborty

Research Assistant, International Development Policy, The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies - Geneva

Emmanuel Dalle Mulle

Research Assistant, International Development Policy, The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies – Geneva

Cartografare il presente

(Figures) http://www.cartografareilpresente.org/‎

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